Poetics of the Iconotext makes available for the first time in English the theories of the respected French text/image specialist, Professor Liliane Louvel. A consolidation of the most significant theoretical materials of Louvel's two acclaimed books, L'Ordre de l'Image: Texte et images dans la littérature anglophone and Texte/Image: Images à lire, textes à voir, this newly conceived work introduces English readers to the most current thinking in French text/image theory and visual studies. Focusing on the full spectrum of text/image relations, from medieval illuminated manuscripts to digital texts, Louvel begins by introducing key terms and situating her work in the context of significant debates in text/image studies. Part II introduces Louvel's typology of pictorial saturation through which she establishes a continuum along which to measure the effect of the most figurative to the most literal images upon written and readers' textual "spaces." Part III explores a phenomenological approach towards the reading-viewing experience as expressed in conceptual categories that include the trace, fossil range, synesthesia, and rhythm and speed. The result is a provocative interplay of the categorical and the subjective that invites readers to think at once more precisely and more inventively about texts, images, and the intersections between the two.

Poetics of the Iconotext

LILIANE LOUVEL

Edited by KAREN JACOBS
Translated by LAURENCE PETIT
Poetics of the Iconotext

LILIANE LOUVEL
Université de Poitiers, France
Edited by
KAREN JACOBS
Translated by
LAURENCE PETIT

ASHGATE
Contents

Introduction: Infinite Dialogues 1

PART I: TEXT/IMAGE: THE INFINITE DIALOGUE

1 What Is an Image? 13
2 The Infinite Dialogue Between Text and Image 31

PART II: MODES OF INSERTION OF THE PICTORIAL:
A TEXT/IMAGE TYPOLOGY

3 Narrative Figures of the Pictorial Image 55
4 From Text to Iconotext: Degrees of Pictorial Saturation 73
5 Functions of the Image: A Pragmatics of the Iconotext 101

PART III: POETICS OF THE ICONOTEXT

6 Variations on the Pictorial 137
7 Beyond the Paragone: Towards a Poetics of Pictorial Rhythm 171

Bibliography 189

Index 203
Chapter 2
The Infinite Dialogue
Between Text and Image

Ever since the beginning of the representational arts, poetry and painting have been related. As Rensselaer W. Lee explains in his book *Ut Pictura Poesis*, which is now a classic:

> Between 1550 and 1750, almost all the treaties on art and literature insist on the kinship between painting and poetry. Admittedly, “the two sisters,” as they were commonly called—Lomazzo notes that they were even born at the same time—were different in their means of expression, but they were considered as quasi identical in their profound nature, their contents and their purpose.¹

Poetry and painting were seen as two inseparable twins, two “sisters,” who were both trying to find their own identity independently of one another. Now, poetry was ranked amongst the liberal arts while painting, considered as a mechanical art, seemed closer to the work of a craftsman, and therefore not noble. Being compared to poetry was therefore to the advantage of painting. However, one of the most valued exercises in poetry—the one that best demonstrated the talent of the artist—was the description of works of art, like that of Achilles’ shield, in the far-reaching rhetorical exercise called *ekphrasis*. Horace’s famous phrase, *ut pictura poesis*, was thus used both ways: undoubtedly “poetry should be like painting,” but “painting should be like poetry” too. We shall see how this debate was taken up by whole philosophical systems, by modes of apprehension of the seeing act, by rhetoric, and by the analysis of descriptive modes.

*Ut Pictura Poesis*: The Paragone

The link between painting and poetry has been acknowledged ever since Antiquity. Lucian and then Petrarch celebrated Homer, “the first painter of ancient memories,”

² “The nouns signifying art are feminine in Greek, Latin, and Italian,” points out Maurice Brock, Lee’s translator.
³ The following titles are most useful: Lee, *Ut pictura poesis*; W.J.T. Mitchell, *Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology* (Chicago, 1986); Yves Bonnefoy, “Ut pictura poesis,”
according to Petrarca. Plutarch saw in Simonides of Ceos, in the sixth century BC, the father of the famous aphorism supposedly at the origin of the comparison between painting and poetry: painting is mute poetry and poetry a speaking painting. "Simonides also affirmed that the poetic word is an image (eikon) of reality: in the poetic text, the word is like those eikones produced by painters and sculptors," as Daniel Arasse explains. The analogy had also been established by Plato in Book Ten of The Republic and in Cratylus.

The origin of the comparison between painting and poetry derives from two major theoretical texts: Aristotle's Poetics and Horace's Ars Poetica. Even though neither Aristotle nor Horace had tried to force a comparison between the two arts, both had suggested stimulating analogies. In Poetics, after positing that painters and poets imitate men and make them better, worse, or similar to us, Aristotle uses a parenthesis to trace a parallel between the structure of the painted work and that of tragedy, i.e. history:

The principle of, as it were, the soul of tragedy is history. The characters come second (this is somewhat similar to painting: if a painter applied at random the most beautiful materials, the result would not be as charming as an image drawn in black and white). The plot is therefore a mere groundwork or sketch.

In Ars Poetica, Horace twice makes a comparison between painters and poets. Lee mentions that he describes:

a painting representing grotesque hybrids and compares it to a book whose wild imaginings mimic the dreams of a deranged person. He concludes by admitting that painters and poets also have the right to exercise their imagination freely as long as this Pegasus whose powers are sometimes dangerous stays tied up in the stables of the probable and the decent.

This is an interesting passage which highlights the connection between artistic creation, the work of the imagination—I am thinking here of Henry Fuseli's Nightmares, which shows a horse leaning over a woman—and the work of dreams. The famous lines 361-5 from Horace's Ars Poetica are the ones, however, in which Horace makes the definite parallel which was to have such an enduring posterity.

Ut pictura poesis. Erit quae, si propius atis,
Te capiat magis, et quaedam, si longius abstes;

4 See Lee, Ut pictura poesis, fn. 6, pp. 7-8.
5 Plutarch, De Glorio Atheniorn, III, pp. 346f-347f.
7 Aristotle, Poétique, VI, p. 50a.
8 Lee, Ut pictura poesis, p. 12, reference to Horace's Ars Poetica, lines 1-13.

Haece amat obscurum, volet haece sub luce vidiri,
Lucis argutum quaee non formidat acumen;
Haece placuit semel, haece decies repetita placbit.

A poem is like a painting. This one will appeal to you more than another if you stand closer to it; this other one if you stand further away. This one requires darkness; this other one needs to be seen in full light, for it can stand the critic's scathing eye. Some only please once, while others, examined over and over again, continue to please.

Now, critics altered Aristotle's and Horace's comparisons by ranking painting as one of the liberal arts. By doing so, they were distorting the original arguments of the two theorists who merely saw, in the parallel between the two arts, a way of showing, in the case of Aristotle, the primacy of structure in tragedies, and in Horace, the various sources of "pleasure" that both painting and poetry can offer depending on point of view, frequency, and lighting effects. It is true, however, that a metaphor is never innocent and that rhetoric plays the part of theory in action, as evidenced by the success of the two comparisons and the ensuing recommendation that poetry must act as painting. Murray Krieger comes back to this aspect of the debate in his discussion of ut pictura poesis: nobody is asking poetry to "act as painting."

In 1667, Charles du Fresny provides the paradigmatic example of an inversion of the phrase. In his poem "De Arte Graphica," he pushes back the period in Horace's quotation beyond the verb erit, thus permanently articulating the similitude around an eloquent chiasmus to such a point that some critics, citing Horace's lines, are in fact citing the first four words of du Fresny's poem:

Ut pictura poesis erit, similique Poesi
Sit Pictura; refert par amulla quaeque sororem,
Alternante vices et nominis; muta Poesis
Dicitur haec, Pictura loqueis solet illa vocari,
Quod fuit audiunt graminum cecinere Poetae;
Quad pulcram aspectus Pictores pingere currant:
Quaeret Poetas in Nurnberi indigina fae,
Non emend Pictorem Operum Studiumque mentur.

Poetry will be like painting; and painting like poetry; the two sisters vie with one another in reflecting each other; they exchange their tasks and their names; painting is said to be mute poetry, and poetry is given the name of speaking painting; poets sing what is pleasant to the ear, while painters endeavor to depict what is beautiful to look at; and what is unworthy of the poets' verse is not worth the painters' efforts either.

9 Lee, Ut pictura poesis, p. 13, fn. 15.
As Daniel Arasse explains:

When classical theory uses again Simonides of Ceos’s arguments and relates them to Horace’s parallel, it does not retain the end of the comparison, forgetting that the Roman poet spoke of the two modalities (close and distant) of pleasure that one can derive from these two art forms. As a result, by inverting the terms of the equivalence and by positing that “painting will be like poetry,” classical thinking, ever since its humanist origin, has worked hard for painting to have the same prestige as poetry, that is to say, in reality, to be submitted to its order, that of discourse.\(^\text{12}\)

This enticing analogy encourages a closeness between the two arts but also a necessary differentiation, even a competition. This is precisely what Leonardo Da Vinci does through what he called Paragone—the fight between the two arts as to which will come first. For Leonardo, which is not surprising, painting wins over her “sister,” poetry, for the basic reason that the visual arts are ... visual, and that the eye is superior to the ear.\(^\text{13}\) As W.J.T. Mitchell writes:

Leonardo musters every traditional sensory prejudice he can think of; the eye is the noblest sense, the window of the soul; it is the most far-reaching and spacious; it is the most useful and scientific, since it naturally constructs a perspectival view “along straight lines that compose a pyramid based in the object and leading to the eye.”\(^\text{14}\)

Leonardo thus states the principle of the visual pyramid and affirms “the difference between painting and poetry, which relies on the difference between shadow and substance, fact and the mere signs of facts.”\(^\text{15}\)

*Ut pictura poesis, ut poesis pictura:* the reversibility of the phrase is edifying. It shows how there has been a shift from the principle advocating the vividness of poetic images when “poetry is like painting” and ascribes the scene described before one’s eyes—the very definition of *enargeia*—to the tradition of historical

\(^{12}\) *Arasse, Le détail*, p. 257.

\(^{13}\) Let us mention on the subject Marianna Torgovnick’s clever use of the *Paragone* as applied to the biographical in her chapter “The Sisters’ Arts,” a chapter in which she studies the emulation that existed between the two Stephen sisters. As was the proper thing to do, Virginia and Vanessa had divided the realm of the arts between the two of them, the one opting for painting and the other for “poetry.” This emulation was not without jealousy on the part of Virginia, as evidenced by her letters in which her compliments come with critical comments, which was not the case with Vanessa. *The Visual Arts, Pictorialism, and the Novel: James, Lawrence and Woolf* (Princeton, 1985).


\(^{15}\) Ibid., p. 118.

painting, placed at the top of the hierarchy of pictorial works, when painting must be like poetry—because, that is to say, it must draw its inspiration from a text (mythological, biblical, historical, etc.) and select the elements in the composition which will make possible the truest and greatest representation of the action. This is what Alberti advocates in *De la peinture* when, after telling the painter to “endeavor to *simulare* only what is seen; the things that cannot be seen are not his responsibility,”\(^\text{16}\) he suggests to start by drawing a rectangle on the figurative plan in the manner of an open window through which the painter will see, not nature, but what he wants to represent; in other words, the arrangement of the scene, the composition of the *istoria*, which corresponds to the rhetorical *dispositio*:

Principio dove io debo dipingiere. Scrivo uno quadrangolo di retti angoli quanto grande io voglio, el quale reputo essere una finestra aperta per donde io miro quello che qui viso sarà dipinto.\(^\text{17}\)

It is appropriate to cite the text in Italian so as to cast aside erroneous translations, like the ones which turned painting into “a window open onto the world.” These metaphorical errors, however, made possible the invention of literary scenic and descriptive devices, as well as framing effects which we shall describe further on.

Text and image are brought together again in Poussin’s famous phrase regarding *La Manne*, when he tells his friend Chantelou: “Read the story and the painting.”\(^\text{18}\) As Daniel Arasse emphasizes:

From this perspective, what we could call the “language” of painting is based on much more than a mere comparison or even the domination of linguistic and rhetorical conceptions of classical culture. If, according to Yves Bonnefoy, the contour of figures is “a trap set by language,” that trap is the very trap of Western representation. Standing at his window, Delacroix sees no contours in nature, but in front of his easel, he uses Nature as a “dictionary.” Poussin, once again, is the one who gave the clearest and most concise formulation of this similarity: “In the same way the twenty-four letters of the alphabet serve to form our words and express our thoughts, the outlines of the body serve to express the various passions of the soul so as to reveal to the outside world what goes through our minds.”\(^\text{19}\)


\(^{17}\) Ibid., vol. I, p. 70.

\(^{18}\) Letter to Chantelou dated November 1747. See Louis Marin’s analysis, which takes up again Poussin’s “alphabet” to evoke the “letters of pictorial writing […] the bodily signs left by the movements of the minds as traces of their emotions,” *Détruire la peinture (To Destroy Painting)*, “Musique poussinienne encore: à propos de la Manne” (Paris, 1977); and Arasse, *Le détail*, pp. 138–9.

\(^{19}\) Arasse, ibid., p. 142, specifies in a footnote that the reference to Yves Bonnefoy is to be found in Bernard Vouiloux, “La description du tableau: la peinture et l’innommable,”
To paint "all that can be seen under the sun" but also to interpret what one sees; to structure the image on the model of language, and also to choose one's subject matter; and finally, to strive towards an ideal form and not a mere imitation of nature—this is another way of espousing Alberti's Neoplatonic Idealism: to paint nature not as it is, but as it should be and also to conform to Aristotle's theory of a selective imitation of nature, for instance by making a hybrid painting which would pick up in various models the details of beauty—as in the case of Zeuxis who drew his inspiration from six young women so as to paint Helen—or by having in mind an ideal of beauty. Imitation painting must be as real and present such an idea of beauty and truth that one cannot tell what is fiction and what is reality. Hence the longevity of the story told by Pliny, the famous episode of Zeuxis' grapes which deceived birds, and the accounts of Philostratus' paintings in which it was impossible to tell "if it was a real bee which was deceived by the painted flowers or who were mistaken, thinking it was real." Is it a bee lured in by the painting or a painting which lures in the viewer? This tale brings us back to the origins of painting: to make absence present and replace it by an illusion.

The Fortunes of *Ut Pictura Poesis*: A Few Theoretical Approaches

Let us now examine briefly a few theories which have had a major impact on the study of the relations between text and image. These theories will help clarify some of the illusions contained in the pictorial devices, as well as highlight the questions debated by experts that we will encounter in our analyses of literary works. In the wake, as it were, of the humanist theory of *ut pictura poesis*, theorists have periodically felt the need to reconsider the *Paragone* in the light of their own period of time. We have seen how Simonides of Ceos viewed painting as mute poetry and poetry as speaking painting, and how Leonardo considered painting as the leader of the arts because of the natural superiority of the eye over the word. Pictorial works thus have an evidentiary value, which explains their apparently immediate presentation of the object.

Edmund Burke, in *A Philosophical Enquiry Into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful*, takes up again the famous opposition between the eye and the ear. Borrowing from the work of Locke—particularly concerning the categories of *wit*, the apprehension of resemblances, and *judgment*, the perception of differences—Burke compares the "sublime" words to the "beautiful" images, thereby drawing the main arguments of his theory of the "sublime." Locke compared poetry and prose, putting poetry on the side of the obscure because of the abundance of images which cannot be seen, and prose on the side of clarity, that of mental images, thus inverting the initial theory which conferred on images a cognitive value. Burke extends this opposition to the comparison between poetry and painting. For if, on the one hand, words are on the side of the obscure, of the difficulty generated by the recognition of resemblances, but also of the suffering caused by the excesses of verbal imagery, leading to confusion and pain and, by extension, to the effect of the sublime, images, on the other hand, are on the side of evidence and clear judgment. Following a painful process which makes possible the perception of distinct images, the subject finally experiences the pleasure of clarity which causes the aesthetic pleasure of the beautiful. We know also how Burke applied the differentiation between the beautiful and the sublime, resemblance and difference, and image and text to the categories of gender and race—the sublime relying on terror and power by being a male aesthetic mode, whereas the beautiful, with its qualities of softness and refinement and its capacity to provide pleasure, was on the side of the feminine. According to him, the French people were on the side of the sublime and the English people on the side of the beautiful; hence his ideological discourse and the political consequences of his theories, inevitable in the context of the French Revolution.

Lessing's *Laocoon*, published in 1766, is famous for its critique of *ut pictura poesis* "as it was embodied by history painters, but also, among the critics of this doctrine, by those who, like de Piles, advocated a wider range of legitimate

---

23 This section draws heavily from Mitchell, *Iconology*, which takes up the various relationships between text and image and offers an excellent synthesis.


activities for painters.”

For Lessing, the aim of painting was above all to represent beautiful bodies. Everything is subordinated to the “koperliche Schönheit,” the beauty of the body. Hence the hierarchy he proposes of the various genres, with landscape painting and still lifes at the bottom of the ladder. History painting did not find favor with him either. The avowed goal of the Laocoon was to put an end to the confusion between poetry (a temporal art) and painting (a spatial art), a famous distinction which concealed the fact that, by assigning to painting the task of rendering the beauty of the body before its expression—“beautiful bodies in beautiful postures”—Lessing unconsciously gave painting the same status as sculpture, as evidenced in the example of the sculpted group emblematic of his theory. If he was criticized for his narrow conception of formal beauty and his rigorous classicism, his famous dichotomy, which divides poetry and painting according to temporal and spatial axes, is still mentioned by critics. According to this theory, poetry is a temporal art requiring a linear form of apprehension, like reading. It is only afterwards, at the end of the reading process, that the work can be appreciated in its totality, through a process of mental reconstruction. Painting, however—the art of visible space, with an evidentiary value—can be apprehended immediately and globally. This theory, as we know, is easy to criticize. Indeed, even if it takes longer to read a novel than to view a painting, it does take time also to decipher a painting. The more knowledgeable in art is the viewer, the longer she will contemplate the work, examining its inner structure, its symbolic elements, and its use of matter. A poem reads faster than a novel but requires one or several re-readings as it resonates with itself and with other works long after the first reading. There are poems whose layout, like calligrams, define a textual space in the same way paintings may tell stories.

Marianna Torgovnick explains that reading a book or a painting requires similar processes as they are both interpretive activities:

Cognitive psychologists have unsettled widely accepted ideas that reading pictures and reading printed pages radically differ. They have shown that the eye does not really perceive paintings holistically, nor really perceive words sequentially.

She cites Ernest Gilman’s argument according to which, in both cases, one has to see the whole thing, and then the parts, and then the whole thing again, this phenomenon being comparable to two activities—that of “reading” and that of “vision” as comprehension.

The difference between the two experiences is apparently in the order of the two operations: we first see a painting, then we “read” it; we read a text, and then we “see” it (in the sense of “understand”). There is also a considerable difference between the first and last perceptions of a painting:

The order of experience in painting (seeing first, then “reading”) is superficially the reverse of the literary experience, except that the final painting which, having been seen and “read” is finally known, is no longer identical with the square of canvas we happened to notice when we first walked into the room.

This schematization of the experience of the legible and the visible in a chiastic mode provides a common ground to the interpretation of texts and paintings. Let us note, however, that if a text is read, and then “seen” as a mental image, painting is seen, then “read,” and then seen again. The text is rarely re-read immediately, except if it poses any specific reading problem; or if the textual strategy requires it to be re-read; or else if a professional obligation compels the reader to go through it again. Is an extra stage therefore necessary in the case of the pictorial or photographic image?

Not only did Lessing contrast painting and poetry in terms of space and time, he also conceived them according to the following dichotomies: natural signs/ arbitrary signs; finite/infinite; imitation/expression; body/soul; exterior/interior; silence/words; the beautiful/the sublime; the eye/the ear; femininity/masculinity. These distinctions illustrate how close Burke’s and Lessing’s theories were at the time. Much later, Ernst Gombrich, in Art and Illusion,

"Cratylus" between “conventional” signs and “natural” signs, drawing the dividing line between language and image according to the axis separating artefact (what is made up by man) and nature (what is given). As was commonly thought even before Plato, images represent objects “directly” and are therefore on the side of nature, whereas language, which requires the mediation of thinking as well as the knowledge of a code, is on the side of convention and artefact. Gombrich criticizes this dichotomy by putting forward the idea of a graphic language of pictorial signs, and of a vocabulary of conventional forms, which rules out the idea of pictorial representation as a mere translation of the real. He thus lays out the foundation stone for a future “linguistics of the image.”

“Nature,” in that sense, is merely a conventional figure, a “second nature”—and not a physical necessity—a code, like, for example, the code of “perspective” that seems “natural” to us. Finally, Gombrich recreates the difference between nature and convention at the level of the reception and production of images for, if the act of seeing is just as natural as the act of opening one’s eyes, the production of

29 See the discussion and clarification by Torgovnick, The Visual Arts, pp. 31–3, as well as work by Rudolph Arnheim, in particular in Visual Thinking (Berkeley, 1969).
30 Torgovnick, The Visual Arts, p. 31.
31 Ibid., p. 34.
33 Ernst Gombrich, Art and Illusion (London [1960], 1995).
an image necessitates all the art available to the creator of images. Therefore, to
draw an outline is not merely a conventional way of circumscribing a subject; it
is also the trace of a routine operation that we carry out when we differentiate
the objects which surround us.

Gombrich’s theory is not approved unanimously; Mitchell criticizes it, seizing
the opportunity to reaffirm the text/image dichotomy in terms of natural vs.
artificial:

Gombrich’s power stems from his ability to retain the “traditional view” of
imagery while flirting with notions that seem innovative, modern or which
approach the boundaries of common sense. 64

Mitchell opposes the easy access to images to the difficulty of reading, images
being the signs that we share with animals and which are thus “naturally” adapted
to our senses.

In Languages of Art, Nelson Goodman elaborates a general grammar of symbolic
systems which relies on a theory of language and resorts to semiotics in the wake
of Roland Barthes’s work in Essais de sémiologie (Elements of Semiology) and
“Rhetorique de l’image” (Rhetoric of the Image). He makes use of the distinction
between a sign and an icon, following the typology established by Charles Pierce,
for whom the world of signs is comprised of icons, symbols, and indexes—i.e.
of signs by resemblance and analogy, signs by convention, and signs by causal
or existential connections. 65 The producer of the text or the image, and consequently
the reader or viewer, must carry out operations of denotation and connotation.
Gombrich elaborates a grammar of difference. For him, the image is part of
a dense, even system, which provides an example of a continuous system akin to
infinity. Each element is connected with the totality and derives its meaning from
the rest. Gombrich illustrates this proposition thanks to the metaphor of the non-
graduated thermometer. Language, on the contrary, is a differentiated symbolic
language which functions in a discontinuous way, as evidenced in the alphabet,
which contains a limited number of well-separated letters. Even when combined
as words, the letters remain isolated by blanks—there is no intermediate character
between a and b—and function as differentiated units, which may be combined
and transferred from one system to another. Language relies on a finite system due
to the limited number of characters, whereas a dense system remains open to an
infinite number of marks which are new, significant, and easy to integrate with the
symbol. The image of the thermometer, graduated this time, provides the model
for this system which functions on the mode of disjunction.

For Mitchell, “The trope of ut pictura poesis, seems, in Goodman’s work, to
have achieved its verbal apothecary. Pictures, like paragraphs, have to be read as
an arbitrary code.” 66 Goodman’s system is obviously not a series of prescriptions
for the artist. Inventionlessness and creativity are there to defy the rules of theorists
and enable artists to create their own theory in constant rupture with what precedes
them. Hybrid forms combining text and image are numerous enough for the
analogical system to be satisfied. As Goodman summarizes it, “a picture in one
system may be a description in another system.” 67 A paragraph may become a
skyscraper’s skyline, or a pictorial work may be covered with letters or legible
sequentially from left to right. It is a matter of symbolic systems and questions of
habit, convention, and prescription on the author’s part.

The aim of this survey of major theoretical works in text and image studies is
to give a few guidelines to the reader. Any review of a theory is necessarily
distorted, and we can only encourage the reader to go back to the sources to
elucidate the questions raised above. Let us note, however, that the issue of
Paragone, the rivalry between text and image, is still much debated among
theorists, who tend to organize the painting space into a “syntax of the visible.”
We have seen that Jean-Louis Schefer’s book, which provides a “scenography of a
painting” under the auspices of signs and syntax, applies a grammar of painting
to Paris Bordone’s The Chess-Players. 68 As to HubertDamisch in Fenêtre jaune
cadmium, 69 who studies the works of contemporary painters Rouan, Mondrian,
and Adami, he compares the paintings to the texts from which they supposedly
originate. Such is the case with Adami’s Freud en voyage (Freud’s Journey) and
Rouan’s braiding effects. In the first example, Damisch takes up Poussin’s
phrase, “Read the story and the painting,” and integrates it to the semiotic analysis
of the painting. In the second example, he uses the old etymology—relayed by
Barthes who connects “text” and “tissu” (fabric)—in Rouan’s work by bringing
together “tresses” (braiding) and text. We may be tempted to see in this constant
seesaw movement between text and image a reminder that language “speaks”
human beings as much as human beings are “language beings,” and that between
pictorial works and human discourse there is an infinite dialogue. Language
figures in and around the works, either in the form of a title which, even when
reduced to the denegation of “Without Title,” exists as a text which produces an
effect. This text triggers a proces of gestalt, as is the case, for instance, in this
small painting by Nicolas de Staël in which vertical blue and white stripes break
apart a pale yellow space—a painting which all at once comes together thanks to
its title, Le Lavandou. 70 Admittedly, one needs to know what the Lavandou is, and
what connotations this place has—such as Provence, the sea, and the sunshine—
hence the parasols and the deckchairs. However, far removed from the abstraction

64 Mitchell, Iconology, p. 87.
65 Goodman, Languages of Art, p. 226.
68 Nicolas de Staël, Peintures et dessins, Catalogue de l’exposition (March 15–June
process, the painting may also be read, first and foremost, as a pictorial manifesto and as a sheer jubilation of paste, matter, and rhythm. There is therefore a double level of reading, as well as the outline of a narrative—the narrative of a day by the sea, or the narrative of the sketch of a composition displaying the paste of the pure color, in one location, and the graphic gesture in another. "We could say that the trace, the hatching, the shape, in other words, the graphic event is what gives the sheet or the canvas its existence, its significance, its jouissance."41

Sometimes the text also appears in the painting, figuring the words uttered by the characters, as in the phylacteries of medieval manuscripts, or inscribed on one of the objects represented. The text may also stand for the voice of the logos inside the tomb, as in Guérin’s The Arcadian Shepherds or in Poussin’s Shepherds of Arcadia, which was so brilliantly analyzed by Louis Marin.42 The text may also be the artists’ signatures as they appear on the sixteenth-century cartellini, sometimes adorned with a fly which seems to have come to perch on the surface represented, beyond the boundaries of the representing space—as a striking example of inganno, savoir faire, and trompe-l’œil. The text may also appear briefly as a commemorative plaque, like that of Philippe de Champaigne which was painted in 1662 and is now displayed at the Louvre.43 Finally, a sentence may sometimes negate the subject of the representation, like Magritte’s famous and polysemic Ceci n’est pas une pipe (This is Not a Pipe). The text constitutes the painting’s system when "undecipherable" types of writings, signs without references, and simulacra of letters cover the surface of the painting, as in some of Nicolas de Staël’s Indian ink drawings—see his 1953 Étude(s) d’après Seghers (Study(ies) after Seghers) and 1953 Etudes de Paysages en Italie (Studies of Italian Landscape),44 which are nothing but traces, accents, and spaces—or some of Braque’s drawings, such as his 1931 Still Life.45 We might also be tempted to do a similar “reading,” at least in part, of Pollock’s drippings, which represent gestures very close to a mode of writing.

The legible may also figure in the form of an object, like the innumerable books that punctuate the history of painting, such as the books in the hands of the Virgin or of the saints; the Books of Hours like that of Mary of Burgundy;46 or the books that the Evangelists or the saints are supposed to be writing, like Hans Memling’s Triptych with Saint-John the Baptist and Saint-John the Evangelist, which is kept at the Hôtel Saint-Jean in Bruges, Belgium, and in which one can see Saint John,

sitting, writing his narrative with various scenes from the Apocalypse painted behind him.47 Finally, even though Duchamp’s ready-mades, for example, turn into art the most prosaic objects, such as a urinal or a bottle-holder, they take on an iconoclastic dimension which destroys painting even more than Caravaggio did according to Poussin’s famous accusation: “M. Poussin, who could not stand the Caravaggio, would say that the latter was born to destroy painting.”48 Those objects nonetheless do produce a theoretical “text” through their incongruous and provocative presence in museums,49 as evidenced by the title of Mitchell’s book, Picture Theory: Ut Pictura Poetica, which plays on Horace’s famous phrase.

After noticing the conflicting relationships between painting and poetry—we have seen that, through a predictable inversion, or chiasmus, painting worked just like poetry, by telling a story—we are now going to examine the instances of the pictorial arts within literary texts. By giving back all its strength to Horace’s phrase, we shall try to see how poetry “is like” or “acts like” painting through a distortion of the phrase. The pictorial image thus appears as the return of the repressed of the “pictorial” text (“poetic” being used here in its broadest sense), in the form of a narrative or indirectly through the descriptive mode.

Figures, Figural, Figured, Figurative, Figuration...

Ekkphrasis

To prolong the comparison between the Sister Arts and ut pictura poesis: ekphrasis is the major figure to which hypotyposes and "tableaux," among others, will conform. Over time, the meaning of ekphrasis—ek-fhrasio meaning “to speak out,” as Ruth Webb recalls,50 was defined at its origins as an extended description of an object in vivid, animated terms—became restricted to the description of an art object (painting or sculpture) which, by being rich and detailed, seems to give it life. It endowed a silent work with the capacity to speak, as the etymology suggests, thus bringing an answer to Simonides of Ceos’s aphorism: mute painting was beginning to talk. It was the ear at the service of the eye, a wider domain traditionally reserved for enargeia, a rhetorical device which consisted in giving a vivid description meant for the eye of the soul. Used by lawyers, enargeia was

41 Barthes, L’obvè et l’obius, p. 178.
42 Marin, Détruire la peinture, pp. 82-114.
43 See Svedana Alpers in her chapter "Regarder les mots," L’art de dépeindre: la peinture hollandaise au XVIIème siècle (Paris, 1990); and André Chastel, Musica depicta.
44 De Staël, Peintures, pp. 11-12 and pp. 187-8.
46 Mary of Burgundy Reading, Mary of Burgundy’s Book of Hours, tenth century, Illumination, reproduced by Daniel Arasse, Le détail, p. 53.
47 Like the burning rock destroying ships, the grasshopper plague, the horses on the beach, the angel, the Lady of the Apocalypse, and the seven-headed dragon. Hilde Lobelle-Caloue, Musée Memling (Bruges, 1987), p. 54.
49 See Alain Séguy-Duclot’s analysis in "Un ready-made est-il une œuvre d’art?", Poétique, 105 (1996): pp. 3-22.
50 For a more recent, sound, and detailed approach of ekphrasis resting on classical theory, see the work of Ruth Webb, Ekphrasis, Imagination and Persuasion in Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Practice (Farnham, 2009).
supposed to help depict the scene in such a way as to lead the judges to a favorable verdict. It gradually ended up coinciding with ekphrasis as a poetic principle, ekphrasis itself having now a restricted field.

In Ekphrasis, an exhaustive book which expands on W.J.T. Mitchell’s work on iconology, Murray Krieger starts by listing the canonical examples of the shields that served as prototypes for ekphrastic description, and then proceeds to examine the theories that punctuated the endless fight Da Vinci called Paragone. Homer’s description of Achilles’ shield, and then Virgil’s description of Aeneas’ shield are indeed descriptions of fictitious works of art since the shields will remain mythical. The rhetorical artifice serves to suspend the action in progress while presenting other actions of a heroic nature, which are supposed to be sculpted onto the shields. Let us note that we are presented here with one of the two functions of narrativized description, as we shall discuss later. Krieger juxtaposes two reproductions of shields. One, after an engraving by Vlieugel reproduced for Pope’s Iliad, appeared in Jean Boivin’s L’Apologie d’Homère et le bouclier d’Achille (Homer’s Apology and Achilles’ Shield); the other, after a photograph of Flaxman’s shield, consists in a silver bas-relief stuck on a plaster mold, dating back to 1821 (Huntington Library). These Achilles’ shields testify to the efforts made by artists to give life, down to the slightest detail, to what was a mere textual shield—a just reward which highlights the constant seans movement between text and image.

The circular shape of the shield produces a circular narrative, the narrative of the injury to Achilles and the hero’s decision not to get revenge, in the same way the Odyssey will be later the narrative of a journey, a voyage in the shape of a loop. We can see through this example that the spatialization of a narrative plays a prominent part, as evidenced by the great number of spatial metaphors in literary discourse, through words such as “structure,” “frame,” “circularity,” “mirror,” “mise en abyme,” “chiasmus,” “figure,” “construction,” “antithesis,” “parallel,” “opening,” “rise,” “peak,” “fall,” “typographic blank,” “texture,” “image,” and “péríode carrée,” as evidenced in the old rhetoric books. The Renaissance used the word “compossession,” from the Ciceroonian tradition of the eulogy, to codify and list the clichés and forms to use in speeches. This phenomenon may be an indicator of the importance of the visual in the act of reading, since the textual image is what remains in the reader’s eye once he/she has put down the book: devices, “frames,” scenes, places, and atmospheres.

Krieger finds the circularity of the canonical ekphrasis in another archeologymetrical model, that of the funeral urn as in Keats’ “Ode on a Grecian Urn,” or in Donne, Shakespeare, T.S. Eliot, and Faulkner. Leo Spitzer, in his analysis of Keats’ “Ode on a Grecian Urn,” has brilliantly shown the fecundity of the circular

shape of the Grecian urn as a modeling principle—a container which mimics its contents since the urn contains the ashes of the deceased. A variation on this theme is to be found in Graham Swift’s novel Last Orders, in which four friends of the deceased, carrying out his last orders, travel from London to Margate, Kent, so as to scatter his ashes. The novel, scattering the narration into a multiplicity of voices—four major ones to which are added minor ones—builds itself as a funeral urn containing fragments of the life of Jack the butcher, which the reader can reconstruct thanks to the polyphonic discourse. “Dust to dust, ashes to ashes,” the rotundity of the last orders’ (plastic) urn is superimposed in parodic mode to the rotundity of the polysemic “last orders” beer glass, the last ritualistic injunction for “last orders” just before a pub closes.

The shape of the funeral urn therefore functions as a paradigmatic model for a lot of other circular narratives which are, for Krieger, like the ouroboros, the eternal return. He sees in it a sign of closure in modern narratives, against which postmodernism will react, refusing closure and, to quote Derrida, the logocentrism of the word which says the world. There are lots of well-known examples of narratives “eating their own tails.” Let us mention, for instance, Barthelemy’s Môbius ring in Welcome to the Finhouse, Joyce’s Finnegans Wake, whose last sentence takes the reader back to the incipit, or Paul Auster’s Moon Palace. Another emblem of circular structure is the wheel which often, as in T.S. Eliot, turns and stays still: “That the pattern may subist, that the wheel may turn and still/Be forever still.” It suffices to read W.B. Yeats and John McGahern to see the importance of wheels, circularity, and circles in Irish literature, for instance, possibly to echo the religious word and also Eliot’s (“in my end is my beginning, in my beginning is my end”), as well as the Celtic entanglements of the Book of Kells. Thinking is thus structured along the axes of time and space, paradigm and syntagm, upon which man inscribes himself in the manner of Leonardo Da Vinci’s human figure.

To summarize, ekphrasis was therefore, in the great poetic tradition, a celebration, an homage. It was part of the epiclectic genre. The representation of a representation, ekphrasis shows itself through this distance as a theoretical act of self-reflexivity from an art form which discloses another art form. It is the non-natural sign of a natural sign within the conversation which aimed at ranking the arts according to the categories of the natural (painting, on account of its immediacy) and non-natural (poetry, on account of its convention and artificiality). The insertion or inclusion within the flux of the narration of a spatial object—shield, urn, painting—spatializes narrative, which is a temporal art, and blues the

See also Grant F. Scott on Keats in The Sculpted Word: Keats, Ekphrasis and the Visual Arts (Hanover, NH, 1994), and James Heffernan’s own references to such a favorite of word/image studies, in his Museum of Words: The Poetics of Ekphrasis from Homer to Ashbery (Chicago, 1993).

51 Krieger, Ekphrasis, fn. 10.
52 Ibid., p. xiii.
sharp distinctions made by Lessing between painting as a spatial art and narrative as a temporal art. Let us note also that Krieger makes a distinction between two types of enargeia. Hypotyposis was one of the forms of the rhetorical trope of enargeia.57 Enargeia, to quote Krieger, is “the capacity of words to describe with a vividness that, in effect, reproduces an object before our very eyes (i.e. before the eyes of the mind)” (65). For Krieger, the first type of enargeia consists in giving a vivid description of the object so as to place it before the eyes of the viewer, who sees it from the exterior and therefore stays at a distance from it. The aim is to produce a verbal equivalent of the object. In the second type of enargeia, the idea is to penetrate the very process of representation, to be as close as possible to the acting creator, to “render” what he felt, what is at the source of his inspiration; in the same way, at the other end of the spectrum, the idea was to “render” the viewer’s feelings and emotion. This is the theory of empathy with the subject, i.e. M.H. Abrams’s “expressive theory,” of which Krieger offers a definition based on the writings of Longin on the sublime—hence its success with the Romantics. This second type of enargeia makes possible, among other things, the description of the fantastic visions which exist only in the creator’s mind. There is therefore an intensity of the visual representation in Enargeia I, and of the emotional reaction in Enargeia II which goes beyond the mimetic representation, central in Enargeia I. This distinction seems useful concerning the various possible combinations between the poles of reception and production of a work, thereby enabling ekphrasis to focus on the description of an image from the viewer’s perspective or to step across the mirror from the creator’s perspective, which changes the textual data and shifts the modalities at stake.

The polarities characterizing the various actors of Krieger’s ekphrasis can be schematized in the following way:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Object (of imitation) Referent</th>
<th>Creator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Viewer</td>
<td>Work of art</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This chart illustrates clearly the systems of polarity and triangularity which are at stake in the relationships between viewer-work-referent, creator-work-referent, and work-referent, but it lacks the interaction between creator and viewer. This schema shows the modes ruling the relationships between the thing and its icon, relationships which can take place on the symmetrical or dissymmetrical, analogical or antithetical, and even transgressive mode.

M.H. Abrams had already suggested a model taking into account the same actors of the artistic relationship, but functioning in a slightly different way. In The Mirror and the Lamp, he draws the famous triangular schema highlighting the various directions taken by criticism, depending on which of the four actors of representation it focuses on:58

**Universe**

**Artist**

**Work**

**Audience**

Hence the following aesthetic preoccupations: “mimetic theory” (concerned with the referent); “pragmatic theory” (whose object is the effect on the viewer and the aim, edifying or didactic); “expressive theory” (the artist expresses his/her feelings); and “objective theory” (concerned with the object, hence the phrase “art for art’s sake”). We can see that these two schemas are reminiscent of that of Roman Jakobson highlighting “the various factors of verbal communication”:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Addresser</th>
<th>Message</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addresssee</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This schema encompasses the six functions, which are oriented according to the six factors of communication: the emotive function (addressee); the poetic function (message); the phatic function (contact); the metalinguistic function (code); the referential function (context); and the conative function (addresser). Jakobson classifies poetic genres also by involving the participants:

Beside the predominant poetic function, [there are also] other verbal functions, in a hierarchical order which varies. Epic poetry, centered on the third person, draws heavily on the referential function; lyric poetry, centered on the first person, is intimately linked to the emotive function; the poetry of the second person is marked by the conative function, and is supplementary and exhortative, depending on whether the first person is dependent on the second or the second on the first.59

We saw that ekphrasis belonged to the epideictic genre, which Philippe Hamon calls “the semiotic counter-gift, in the form of a text, owed by the collectivity who designates the describer to do so, and given to some beneficiary (king, nature, God, etc.).” Ekphrasis therefore combines the referential function and the conative function, which also appears in classical descriptive modes, such as prosopopeia which gives a voice to the absent, hence apotropaic and dialogism.

57 Not to be confused with enargeia, the powerful presentation of an argument.
And prosopopeia is one of the staples of James Hefferman’s own discussion of *ekphrasis* and of Krieger’s work; thus he makes a point of drawing a line between Krieger’s work and his own. His approach is more rhetorical and he clearly advocates the dynamic quality of *ekphrasis*, refusing to see it as a frozen part of a text, a trait I would strongly support. Interestingly enough, he puts forth the fact that “what has kept it alive is its paragonal energy” (Hefferman 6). For Hefferman, *ekphrasis* is “an enduring as well as ancient poetic mode” (Hefferman 137). He also sees it in gendered terms, which is a trait I also defended. Image (description) is seen in feminine terms, whereas language (narrative) verges on the masculine. Hefferman mostly studies *ekphrasis* in relation to poetry, its ideal locus as it were. This book will focus on *ekphrasis* in fiction, a different kind of *ekphrasis* altogether producing or responding to different ways of working/reading. Hefferman also insists on it being a mode more than a genre. For Hefferman, *ekphrasis* works along four lines—conversion, fiction, Paragone, prosopoeia envoicing (Hefferman 136)—that we shall also find in my analyses. From mere ornament to self-sufficient detachable piece as Barthes recalled, the evolution of *ekphrasis* is also linked to the evolution of museums according to Hefferman, a stimulating point indeed (Hefferman 138).

To represent works of art through language is to proceed to an operation of over-coding, i.e. to present a second time the sensible world which was already represented, i.e. Plato’s appearances of appearances. The artistic image within the text takes on an epistemic or heuristic value. It is always “already there,” “pre-constructed,” as the linguists say. It thus appears as a place where meaning is increased, a place of aesthetic over-saturation. This will lead us to posit the artistic image as a trope, a full-fledged “figure” of enargeia of which hypotyposis and *ekphrasis* are specific forms.

Svetlana Alpers has brilliantly shown the heuristic value of Dutch painting, a “descriptive” sort of painting which she opposes to the narrative value of Italian painting based on the Albertian model. Dutch painting is supposed to have popularized the discoveries of physics, in particular optics. The minute work of Dutch painters—who were more concerned with the details and light (lumen) coming from the objects than with the light (lux) coming from the viewer’s eye, and who lit up the objects according to an anthropocentric tradition—paved the way for Kepler, whose theories of vision as a mere recipient of images at the back of one’s eye revolutionized dioptics. Therefore, according to Alpers, Dutch painting, concerned with nature, has a descriptive nature, recording the world as the image does at the back of the retina, which Kepler calls “pictura,” ut *pictura, ita visio*—unlike the Albertian model which imposes a frame on representation in the form of a window. Let us mention that in the hierarchy of arts, the Italian Renaissance ranked narrative painting, and above all history painting, first. Landscapes and still lives, which were favored by Dutch painting, came last.

Finally, let us note that according to the rules of *ekphrasis*, to describe a work of art so vividly that it seems to place the object before the viewer’s eyes paved the way for fantastic and Gothic art, which knows no boundaries when it comes to making paintings talk, animating statues, or having their characters step off their pedestals, or out of their frames, as in Walpole’s *The Castle of Otranto*—not to mention conversations which resurrect the dead and leave behind houses fissured from top to bottom and about to collapse into the dark waters of a pond (think of Edgar Allan Poe’s *The Fall of the House of Usher*).

**Hypotyposis**

According to Pierre Fontanier, there are only two “figures of style by imitation”: hypotyposis (to make someone see) and harmonism (to make someone hear). He reminds his readers that hypotyposis comes from the Greek word signifying “model, original, painting” and derives from the verb “to draw, to paint.” Stemming from “under” and “to figure,” hypotyposis, just like *ekphrasis*, makes the person see the object vividly, “replaces the original with the copy” (Fontanier 266).

Hypotyposis paints things in such a vivid and forceful manner that it places them, as it were, before the eyes of the viewer and turns a narrative or a description into an image, a painting, or even a real-life scene [...] sometimes, it consists in just one stroke [...] sometimes, there are several strokes, brought together in a narrow frame, more or less single sentence [...] sometimes also, a series of sentences, a series of hypotyposes, produce a painting which is more or less large and more or less complex. (390, emphasis mine)

It is pertinent to mention that if, in the definition, hypotyposis varies in length (the shorter version being the diatyposis, which has fewer words and things visualized, in the same way a metaphor is shorter than an allegory), the sentence plays the part of the *frame*, the series of sentences that of the *painting*, and the pictorial code is brought up to convey the vividness of the description. Bernard Dupriez confirms the link with the pictorial in the following way:

Hypotyposis is therefore a development of the image in the double sense of the term: visual image and rhetorical image (metonymy or metaphor); [...]
comparisons, allegories, and applications will often be hypotyposes when they
form an image.63

He makes the distinction between a descriptive hypotyposis and a rhetorical
hypotyposis, “in which the action is an artificial representation of the iden.” It is
therefore not surprising that in order to convey the impression of life, writers
should sometimes resort to what was called in the nineteenth century a “tableau
vivant,” a kind of mise en scène of a famous painting or historical event, which is
a hybrid form drawing from the theater, from painting, and from real life. A writer
like Angela Carter made the most of this hybrid form in Nights at the Circus,
thanks to a baroque and lush kind of writing. It would be worth analyzing the
relations between theatricality and painting for, as we know, certain “scenes”
were the occasion of veritable pictorial or artistic arrangements within Italian
design. They were conceived as “tableaux,” a term used in the theater. The mise
en scène is like a survival of the painter’s eye framing the scene, setting the décor,
and choosing the colors of the costumes; while in their interpretation of body
language or kinesics, the body movements were like Poussin’s alphabet, which
was mentioned above. Bob Wilson’s work is there to remind us of this period,
just like the memory of the dialogue between Greuze’s paintings and Rousseau’s
theatrical attempts.

For Morier also, hypotyposis is a figure which consists in “describing a scene
so vividly, dynamically, and accurately that it meets our eyes with the presence,
the sharpness, and the colors of reality.”64 Note here the word “presence” for what
is in fact absent, which is precisely one of the functions of re-presentation, making
the scene so lively, as well as the word “relief,” a characteristic of animated beings
but also of sculpture. The reference to “colors” also suggests the emphasis on
the pictorial code. These comments are corroborated by the following remark by
Francis Wey and his insistence on the analogy with painting:

Almost all figures are descriptions in disguise: any allegory, any metaphor even,
is a brief description; he who cannot describe cannot write. Poetic imagination
is conveyed through a multiplicity of images; to describe is to paint, and to paint
is to form images.65

Rhetoric offers a whole series of categories which make it possible to relate a
“pictorial” description to the various genres of painting. Bernard Dupriex suggests
as synonyms of hypotyposis: “image (Boileau); painting (Fenelon); painting
(Fontanier); painted image (Edmond De Goncourt), mise en scène, energy

65 Francis Wey, Remarques sur la langue française (Paris, 1845), vol. 2, p. 404, cited by
Philippe Hamon, Introduc à l’analyse du descriptif, p. 25.
many twinklings of meaning that signal themselves in the interstices opened by the wound caused by the image to the body of the text, when the image "touche" and "leaves marks." The image is also a figured fantasy which manifests itself against the resistance of the text. Style is what opens the text, revealed like those anatomy figures, cutaway drawings. The image is what also makes possible a thorough investigation of the flesh of the text, the layered organics under smooth aesthetics when the anatomic Angel spreads its wings. This too is an illusion.


Bibliography

Literary Theory and Word/Image Studies

Jan Baetens and Pascal Lefèvre, Pour une lecture moderne de la bande dessinée (Amsterdam/Brussels, 1993).
———, L'origine et l'obit (Paris: Seuil, 1982).
Brunet, Roger, La carte, mode d’emploi (Paris: Fayard, 1987).
de Piles, Roger, Cours de peinture par principes (Paris: Gallimard [1708], 1989).
Deleuze, Gilles et Félix Guattari, Mille plateaux (Paris: Minuit, 1980).
——, Ce qui nous voyons, ce qui nous regarde (Paris: Minuit, 1992).
——, Devant le temps (Paris: Minuit, 2000).


—, *Textes/Imagery Images à lire textes à voir* (Rennes: PUR, 2002).

—, *Le tiers pictural, par une critique intermédiaire* (Rennes: PUR, 2010).


and Ogée Frédéric (eds.), *Representation and Performance in the 18th Century* (Trier: WVT, 2006).


**Articles**


———, “Photography and Literature,” *English Language Notes*, 44/2 (Fall/Winter 2006).


Mitchell, W.J.T., “The Commitment to Form; or, Still Crazy After All These Years,” *PMLA*, 118 (2003).


Sabry, Randa, “Raconter les pouvoirs de la peinture,” *Poétique*, 121 (February 2000).


———, “‘L’impressionnisme littéraire’: une révision,” *Poétique*, 121 (February 2000).


**PhD Dissertations**


**Catalogues, Exhibitions**


**Literary Works, Essays, and Writers’ Diaries**


Swift, Jonathan, Gulliver’s Travels (London: Routledge, 1726).
Winterson, Jeanette, Art and Lies (London: Cape, 1994).
———, Moments of Being (St Albans: Panther Books, 1976).
———, Orlando (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982).
Index

Abrams, M.H. 46, 189
Achilles's shield, 31, 44, 99
Ackroyd, Peter 58, 61, 66, 67, 110, 117, 121, 131, 199
aesthetic arrangement 94, 96, 97, 98, 99
affect, 8, 25, 76, 148, 186, 187
Alpera, Sylwana 42, 48, 189
amorphous, amorphous 17, 57, 63, 130, 141, 155, 182, 198
anthropomorphic 162, 166, 196
appearance/disappearance 16, 18, 115
Arasse, Daniel 32, 34, 35, 189
archipictoriality 6, 63, 70
Aristotle 3, 15, 24, 32, 33, 36, 156
Armstrong, Nancy 149, 150, 189
Auré 17, 22, 91, 110
Auster, Paul 8, 45, 69, 70, 104, 108, 114–116, 152, 199
Baltrusaitis, Jurgis 63, 69, 189
Banville, John 61, 63, 66, 101, 105, 107, 108, 110, 123, 128, 130, 171, 172, 199
Baridon, Michel 5, 17, 194
Benjamin, Walter 22, 187, 194
Benveniste, Emile 175, 177, 194
Blake, William 14, 67, 197
Buci-Glucksmann, Christine 155, 158, 161, 163, 165, 166, 167, 190
Byatt, A.S. 61, 63, 69, 104, 105, 117, 120, 124, 198, 199
camera obscura 65, 141, 144, 150
Carter, Angela 50, 199
cartography 147, 151, 155, 157, 160, 161, 162, 163, 166, 168, 194, 197, 199
chiaroscuro 58, 129

chiasmus 18, 22, 33, 39, 43, 44, 45, 65, 73, 112, 119, 122, 126, 146
Coetzee J.M. 8, 16, 58, 77, 115, 151, 154, 165–166, 200
Danisch Hubert 29, 35, 41, 190
Derrida (and Guattari) 113, 155, 156, 165, 166, 167, 168, 190
Derrida Jacques 7, 45, 59, 67, 82, 101, 123, 140, 151, 197
Dialogue (infinite) 1, 2, 5, 9, 11, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41, 43, 45, 47, 49, 51, 79, 101, 113, 125, 127, 137, 151, 159, 175, 185
Diderot Hubert Georges 20, 67, 84, 112, 186, 187, 190 199
“double exposure” 84, 154
Duchamp Marcel 22, 70, 138

eikphraes, eikphrases 4, 15, 16, 31, 34, 43–6, 49, 50, 51, 60–66, 70, 71, 73, 80, 89, 90, 91, 97–100, 110, 111, 116, 120, 121, 125, 126, 128, 139, 142, 152, 159, 162, 172, 173, 193, 194, 196, 200
enargeia 43, 46, 98, 110
epengea 177, 186, 187.
epistemology 7, 9, 10, 101, 156, 157
Eschonias, Elise 177, 179, 185, 191
eye of the text 4, 7, 60, 83, 99, 113, 127, 145, 153, 154, 168
figural 6, 16, 17, 64, 89, 109
figuration 4, 6, 8, 9, 16, 171, 175, 190
Flaxman, Rhoda 44, 77, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 95, 191
Fludernik, Monika 55, 61, 192
Focalization 8, 83, 115
Foucault, Michel 14, 17, 185, 191