COMMUNITY

"Common" derives from Latin communis, "what belongs to everyone," from cum, "with," and munus, "what fulfills its task, its duty" (related to munus, office, gift); it corresponds to Greek koinos [κοινός], "common, public," in which we probably see the same root as in the Latin cum, and which contrasts with ialides [ίαλίδες], "peculiar, private." "Community" designates the fact of being in common, what is held in common, and the group or institution that shares what is held in common.

I. Common and Community

1. What is held in common is opposed to what is one's own and to property: see PROPERTY.

2. "Common" can be used in reference to different levels of community. It can refer to humanity as a whole: see LOGOS, SENS COMMUN, UNIVERSALS, as well as AUTRUI, HUMANITY [MENSCHHEIT], IDENTITY, I/ME/MySELF, SAMOST, SELBST. Or it can refer to a particular human community defined as a people (see PEOPLE AND NAROD; cf. HEIMAT), or as a culture (see BILDUNG, CIVILITA, CULTURE, TO TRANSLATE) considered distinctive because of some privileged trait (see MALAISE).

II. Political Community and Society

1. The entry CIVIL SOCIETY explores the main systems used to describe the community, as opposed to society and the state. For Greek, in addition to koinonia politikē [κοινωνία πολιτική] (CIVIL SOCIETY, I), see the entries for POLIS, OIKIEGOS, OIKONOMIA. For Latin, in addition to societas civilis (CIVIL SOCIETY, I), see PIETAS, RELIGIO, and cf. LEX. On the distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft in German, see CIVIL SOCIETY, Box 1.

2. In mir [mir], Russian has a special constellation that refers simultaneously to peace, the world, and the peasant community: see MIR and SOBORNOST (conciliatory, communal), and cf. NAROD (people); cf. CONCILIARITY.

3. The contemporary avatars of the political promotion of the community are considered in the entry LIBERAL, Box 3.

> ALLIANCE, CONSENSUS, OBLIGATION, STATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPARISON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FRENCH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREEK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALIAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATIN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparison or similar has suffered by the recent success of metaphor. It has served as a foil for its brilliant alter ego. To restore its interest, we have only to recall that the apparently canonical comparatio-metaphor pair is deceptive. This pair comes from a passage in Quintilian that has been taken out of context. In Latin, comparatio designates
only in a marginal way a similarity introduced by a word such as "like." It refers to a mental operation: making a parallel between x and y in order to bring out resemblances and differences. The expression comparatio n'est pas raison (comparison is not reason) reminds us both that comparison is an instrument for producing intelligibility and that this instrument works well, almost too well: from here comes the need to be prudent in using the extremely fertile method of comparatives (comparative studies).

I. Comparatio, Sugkrisis, "Parallel"

Comparison is an image or figure of speech in a specialized and marginal sense. In the whole of Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria (The Orator’s Education), this sense appears only once among the twelve occurrences of the words comparatio and comparativus listed in the index of the Belles Lettres edition. In a massive, generic way, comparatio designates a parallel: the comparison of x and y in order to discern their resemblances and differences, and often to emphasize the superiority of one over the other. In Greek, the equivalent word is sugkrisis (σύγκρισις), which is frequently used with this meaning, but in the late period (from Philodemus to Plutarch). As sugkrisis suggests, the point is to exercise one’s judgment, to judge one thing in relation to another—sug krisis [σύγκρισις] is put together from sun (with) and krisis (judgment). The result is not a little formula tossed off in passing, a figure of style, but a long, complete development.

Thus comparatio is one of the preliminary exercises given in rhetoric classes (Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, 2.4.21). It has the length of an academic “assignment,” and as such, it was part of the baggage of every cultivated person from antiquity to the ancient régime. In this culture, to make a comparison was also to provide oneself with the means to construct a whole development. Thus comparison is a “figure of thought,” or more literally, a “figure of sentences” (Lat. figura sententiarium), that is, one that extended over one or more sentences. Similarly, comparison is related to conception and invention: considering something in a nutshell and then developing what one has seen in all its consequences. A visionary like Victor Hugo was well aware of its virtually endless possibilities. For example, in his novel Notre-Dame de Paris, the formula “Ceci tuera cela” (This will kill that, 5.2) launches the extensive comparatio between x, the book, and y, the cathedral.

One example of a class assignment with its possible developments is found in Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria (8.4.14; cf. 8.4.9–14). Discussing one of Cicero’s speeches, Quintilian notes that “here Catiline is compared to Graccus, the constitution of the state to the whole world, a slight change for the worse to fire and sword and desolation, and a private citizen to the consul, all comparisons affording ample opportunity for further individual expansion, if anyone should desire to do so.” This allows us to understand better the most common specialized sense of sugkrisis. The Greek word designated a classic exercise in literary criticism: a parallel between two authors or two works, the better to differentiate them. There again, academic culture long retained the memory of this: we recall the classic assignment on Racine and Corneille, people as they are and as they should be. Longinus’s On the Sublime includes a number of such exercises, whether the parallel/difference between the Iliad and the Odyssey, between Plato and Lysias, or between Demosthenes and Cicero. A pairing like Demosthenes and Cicero, developed at greater length, is the basis for Plutarch’s Parallel Lives. Plutarch concludes the discussion of almost every pair of men with what he calls literally a sugkrisis: a comparison of Theseus and Romulus, Lycurgus and Numa, and so on.

II. Eikón and Metaphora, Similitudo and Tralatio: The Status of “Like”

With respect to this fundamental meaning, a comparison is the modern sense is called a “simile”; the English renders the Latin similitudo, which itself rendered the Greek eikón, “icon” or “image.” Moreover, the idea that metaphor is an abbreviated simile comes from Quintilian (Institutio oratoria, 8.6.8). Quintilian takes from Aristotle the excessively famous example of “Achilles like a lion,” as opposed to “Achilles is a lion” (Aristotle, Rhetoric, 3.4.1406b20–24; Quintilian, institutio oratoria, 8.6.9). Aristotle distinguishes between eikón [εἰκών] and metaphor [μεταφορά] (Rhetoric, 3.4.1406b20–23), and Quintilian between similitudo and tralatio, the latter word being itself the Latin equivalent of the Greek metaphor, which Quintilian also uses:

Aristotle:    Quintilian
eikón = similitudo
metaphora = tralatio

* See Box 1.

Note that the concept of comparatio is not part of this table—of this register of concepts. Quintilian imports the noun comparatio for explanatory purposes, to show what happens in a simile and thus also in a metaphor. In his work, comparatio is hardly more than a deverbial noun derived from the verb comparare, which he had initially used. A simile is “like” a parallel/difference, the latter being as familiar to readers of Quintilian—or Aristotle—as it is unfamiliar today:

In totum autem metaphoram brevior et similitudine, eoque distat quod illa comparatur rei quam volumus exprimere, haec pro ipsa re dicitur. Comparatio est cum dico fercisse qui hominem "ut leo," tralatio cum dicere hominem "leo est."

(On the whole metaphor is a shortened form of simile, while there is this further difference, that in the latter we compare some object to the thing which we wish to describe, whereas in the former this object is actually substituted for the thing. It is a comparison when I say that a man did something like a lion; it is a metaphor when I say of him, "He is a lion.")

(Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, 8.6.8–9, trans. Russell)

From comparare to comparatio, the verb and noun are there to make it understood that the essential point is not the presence or absence of the word “like.” The point is that a parallel between Achilles and a lion would develop at length every-thing that belongs to the hero and everything that belongs: to the animal to discriminate between them by means of a parallel/difference. This very intellectual process is thus the inverse of metaphor. The simile maintains the distance
Reminder: Aristotle's definition of “metaphor”

The recent success of metaphor draws its title of nobility from Aristotle. Metaphor, unlike comparison or simile, is a trope, a “figure of words,” namely, according to its canonical definition in the Poetics, giving a thing a name that belongs to something else, (ονοματικός άλλοτριος επιφάνεια ένδοτος άλλοτριος σύνθεσις), 1457b7–8, trans. Bywater, 1476. This may be done by moving from the genus to the species, from species to species, or, finally and especially, in accordance with a relationship of “analogy”: a metaphorical expression then abbreviates and summarizes a proportional relationship, to call the evening “day’s old age” is to imply that evening is to day as old age is to life. Whereas for Quintilian, metaphors are “abbreviated similes,” for Aristotle “comparisons (εικόνες (εικόνας)) are metaphors that need logos (λόγος δεικτικός λόγος δεικτικός),” that is, as Dufour and Wartelle translate it, that “need to be developed” (Rhetoric, 3.14.167b14–15), but “just because it is longer, it is less attractive” (3.10.14.10b18–19).

Both metaphor and simile are mental operations. So far as metaphor is concerned, when the poet calls old age a “withered stalk,” he conveys a new idea, a new fact (ποιητικά μαθηματικά γένος) to us by means of the general notion of “lost bloom,” which is common to both things” (3.10.14.10b15–16). And “in philosophy also an acute mind will perceive resemblances (εις ομοιομορφίαν το ομοιόμορφον ομοίωμα) even in things far apart” (3.11.14.2127–13). The success of a metaphor, even in the form of a witticism (ατελίον [ατελίον], 3.11.14.2127–24), has to do with

the brilliance of the connection between philosophy and poetry.

One of our problems with the passage from Aristotle to Quintilian is a problem of translation, namely, a difference in the way the Greek is rendered in Latin and in French: Quintilian translates εἰκόνα, the other word Aristotle uses for “metaphor,” which is generally translated in French by comparaison, as similaitud and not comparaison.

Barbara Cassin

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aristotle: Poetics. Translated by Ingram Bywater. In


New York: Random House, 1941.

Rhetorica. Edited by H. Dufour and A.


COMPARISON

between Achilles and the lion (see here the verb distat, which
is typical of comparatio), whereas metaphor fuses these two
roles in a flash of intuition. Length in one case and brevity in
the other merely indicate the difference between these two
mental processes. On the whole, the presence of “like,” which
has so hypnotized criticism, is just the tip of the iceberg. It
embodies a kind of metaphorical expression, since the “like”
forestalls complete assimilation. But making it the absolute criterion for
distinguishing between simile and metaphor is erroneous and
leads to many disappointments: this criterion doesn’t work.

So let us set aside comparison in the modern sense. In
“comparison” in the sense of parallel/difference, the point
is to juxtapose two elements that then correspond—without
ever being conflated. Let us take an example. In his chapter
on the verbal figures, Quintilian deals with the use of repetition
taken from Cicero. Here the repetition involves the first
words of the parts of the period, “you” and “him,” in a parallel
between you the jurist and him the military leader—a
famous parallel because, contrary to all expectations, Cicero
gives the advantage to the military man:

Vigfas tu de nocte ut tuis consolitoribus respondeas, ille
ut eo quae intendit mature cum exercitum perveniat: te
gallorum, illum buccinum cantus excitat; tu actio
nem instituit, ille aciem instrius; tu cives ne tu consul
tores, ille ne urbes aut castra captantur.

(You pass wakeful nights that you may be able to reply
to your clients; he that he and his army may arrive
betimes at their destination. You are roused by cock
crow, he by the bugle's revelle. You draw up your legal
pleas, he sets the battle in array. You are on the watch
that your clients be not taken at a disadvantage, he that
cities or camps be not so taken.)

(Cicero, Pro Murena, 22, quoted in Quintilian,
Institutio oratoria, 9.3.32, trans. Cousin)

This is a good example of the possible length: the parallel
extends over ten paragraphs, from §19 to §28. Moreover,
it is accompanied by another that serves as its conclusion,
the parallel between the orator and the jurist—the orator
being just as superior to the jurist as the military leader is
($92–90$). Quintilian quotes this passage and comments:
“in antitheses and comparisons (in contrapositis vel comparatis),
the first words of alternate phrases are frequently repeated
to produce correspondence [solent respondere primorum verbis
alterna repetito]” (9.3.32).

Contra-postum; this is not far from the Italian word contu
punto, “counterpoint,” and the French contre, one of the
words by which French rhetorical textbooks of the eighteenth
century retranslate comparatio.

III. Contraposito and Antithesis

Contrapositis is the Latin word that Quintilian uses in the same
chapter 3 of book 9 to render the Greek antitheton [ἀντιθέτον] in
referring very specifically to the verbal figure called
“antithesis.” In all of these words, the prefixes anti- [ἀντί] or
contra- largely determine the meaning. The Greek word for
“antithesis” can designate any kind of parallel, it refers liter
ally to the act of setting one thing next to another, -postum
translating -toton, and contra- translating anti-. In this very
general sense, antithesis is a special case of paraphrase. When
two elements are set opposite each other, they correspond
either by being similar, symmetrical (para[n]a), parallelism, parathesis, adposia; cf. Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 5.10.86: "Adposita vel comparativa") or by being dissimilar, opposed (anti-, contrast, antithesis contrastoposita). Furthermore, anti-
does not necessarily signify the exact contrary: the island of Anticythera is simply the one that is across from Cythera; 
x and y face each other. We could say the same about the 
prefix para-: parallélol [para[lambda]] is constructed on the 
basis of allélol [allálos], "one and the other": to juxtapose. 
One of the words in the entry on sugkrisis in Hesychius of 
Alexandria's Greek dictionary even combines the two prefixes 
anti- and para-. This word is *antiparathanesiš* [avθ̣̱κραποθανείς], which is used, for example, by Dionysius of Halicarnassus to designate, very simply, a parallel/difference—in short, a 
contrast, in this case between the bad Hegesias and the ex-
cellent Homer (On Literary Composition, 6.18.24). Elsewhere, 
Quintilian says again that he translates the Greek *antiparathēsis* 
[avthetēsis] by *comparative*: this clearly emphasizes that the 
esential element is the prefix (Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 7.4.12).

IV. Comparison and Comparatism:
Double Attention and the Aesthetics of Counterpoint

This terminological complex thus allows us to broaden 
the brief article "Comparison" in Lalande's Vocabulary 
(KT: Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie, s.v.). The lat-
ter refers, rightly, to Etienne Bonnet de Condillac and his school. 
The quotation from Condillac's *Logique* (1.7) is interesting:

As we give our attention to an object, we can give it to 
two at once. Then, instead of one exclusive sensation, 
we experience two, and we say that we are comparing 
them, because we experience them exclusively in order 
to observe them side by side, without being distracted 
by other sensations: and this is exactly what the word 
"compare" means. Comparison is thus only a double 
attention.

This quotation reminds us in a remarkable way of the fol-
lowing passage in Petrarach, which Condillac probably did 
not know. Petrarach develops his long and famous parallel, or 
comparatio, between solitude and urban life (On the Solitary 
Life, 1.1.8). He notes:

I think that I shall describe all this better if I do not de-
vote separate developments to everything that it seems 
to me could be said about these two ways of life: I shall 
on the contrary mix them, referring by turns to a given 
aspect of one of them, so that attention (animus) is di-
rected now to one side, now to the other, and that I can 
gauge, looking from the right and from the left as one 
does with an alternate movement of the eyes, the differ-
ence that separates the most dissimilar objects placed 
next to each other.

This quotation shows how instructive it would be to limit 
oneself to Condillac alone. The philosopher elaborates in 
his own idiom, explicating a notion that he finds in "ordi-
nary" language—a notion that was elaborated a long time 
before and that he inherited from the whole rhetorical cul-
ture of his time. Before Condillac there was at least Aris-
totle. In his *Topics*, comparison is involved in two of the four 

instruments, or *organs*, that provide an abundant source of 
propositions. These are the third and fourth instruments: at-
tention directed toward differences and then resemblances 
(Topics, 1.16.107b–17.108a).

- See Box 2.

As Aristotle described it, comparison serves first of all to 
make inductions: to bring out the universal by comparing 
individual cases (Topics, 1.18.108b). By whatever mediation, 
the idea of comparatio is at the origin of all the comparative 
disciplines that emerged at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. Comparative anatomy was inaugurated by Georges 
Cuvier's *Leçons d'anatomie comparée* (1800–1805), and was soon 
followed by comparative physiology (1833), comparative em-
byology, and so on. François Raynaud's *Grammaire comparée 
des langues de l'Europe latine dans leurs rapports avec la langue 
des troubadours* (1821) provided the foundation for the discipline 
of Romanistik founded by Friedrich Diez some fifteen years 
later. Comparative geography was inaugurated by Carl Rit-
ter's *Die Erdkunde im Verhältnis zur Natur und zur Geschichte des 
Menschen oder allgemeine vergleichende Geographie* (1817–59), 
part of which was translated into French by Eugène Buret 
and Édouard Desor as *Géographie générale comparée* (1835–36). 
In his anthology, *Cours de littérature comparée* (1816–24), Fran-
çois-Noël limited himself to juxtaposing texts in French, Latin, 
English, and Italian. In his *Mémoires d'outre-tombe* (1848–50), 
Chateaubriand went so far as to call his *Essai sur les révolutions*, 
originally published in 1797, "a comparative work on revolu-
tions [un ouvrage sur les révolutions comparées]." The general 
movement is in fact that of the "double attention" Condillac 
talked about. More than comparé (compared), this should be 
called comparant (comparing), as in German (vergleichend), 
or "comparative," as in English. What counts is not so much 
the two objects juxtaposed as the intellectual act of bringing 
them together.

The fact that comparison does not always provide proof in 
no way deprives the method of interest: because it is inher-
ently plural, comparison elicits thought. To put the point in 
the old terms, comparison is part of topics, which is a matter 
of invention and not of criticism, which concerns judgment.

First invent, then judge. First find, produce results, then 
weigh and reweigh, decide what the results mean. To reject 
the comparative method because some of its results are un-
acceptable is to fail to understand its role as an instrument, 
a tool. This negative judgment generally goes hand-in-hand 
with an inability to explain one's own topics, one's way of 
collecting the materials for thought.

Comparison thus understood can be used not only as an 
intellectual tool but also as an aesthetic means. We have seen 
this in the quotation from Cicero's *Pro Mulerno*, in which the 
alternating repetition of the first words produces a figure, a 
sort of rhythm, "you ... him." Here are two further examples.

In musical terms, contrast or contraposition is somewhat 
like counterpoint. The Greek word sugkrisis is attested, in 
the Septuagint, in the very specialized sense of "musical 
concert": *Ecclesiasticus* (Sirach) 32 (35).? Here we are in a 
context of harmony: the person presiding over the banquet 
is asked not to "strike a false note" by inappropriately lec-
turing people who want to party. Good taste consists, on the 
contrary, in being like "a carbuncle seal on a ring," like "a
The comparison of the arts

The comparison of the arts is a literary genre that began in the Renaissance and continued throughout the classical period. It took several forms. The first and most important was a parallel between the arts of the visible and those of discourse: painting and sculpture on the one hand, poetic arts on the other. On the basis of this comparison, which is in a way generic, more specific forms of comparison emerged—comparisons between painting and sculpture, or between painting and music. The Italian word paragone, which means "comparison," in general, was used in all European languages to designate the comparison between painting and sculpture that gave rise to many debates in the sixteenth century. The comparison between painting and music (the analogy between sound and color, reflections on the notion of harmony) was also present in the Renaissance and in the classical age. It was revived in the eighteenth century with the birth of abstract art.

The comparison between the arts of the eye and those of the ear is part of a long tradition that, according to Plato, goes back to Simonides, and that was spread during the Renaissance through the reading of Horace. In the Art of Poetry, Horace says, "What is heard, not seen, is weaker in the mind than what the eyes record faithfully as it happens" (Art of Poetry, trans. Raffel). But it is another remark of Horace that was to play a crucial historical role, the one in which he drew a parallel between painting and poetry: "ut picture poëtas erit," a poem is like a picture (ibid.). Adopted by the theoreticians of the Renaissance, this comparison is at the origin of what has been called the doctrine of ut picture poëtas. But this doctrine is based on a misunderstanding, or rather an inversion: whereas Horace compared poetry to painting, relating the arts of language to those of the image, Renaissance authors inverted the direction of the comparison. A poem is like a picture, became "a picture is like a poem." The phrase ut picture poëtas, as it was understood in the field of discourse on art, always consisted in defining painting in determining its value, in relation to criteria of the poetic arts. This doctrine was unquestionably fertile for several centuries; it played an essential role in helping painting acquire the dignity of the liberal arts (see ART). Through this comparison, the painter was able to accede to the rank of the poet and the orator. The expressions picture laqueus and muta poësis are topos that serve to qualify poetry and painting, and painting, the latter being often represented in engravings by a figure wearing a blindfold or holding a finger to its mouth. Painting is a "mute poetry" and poetry is a "speaking picture." Seventeenth-century French writers called them "sisters" (sœurs); the English called them the "sister arts" and described them as united in a constant relationship of reciprocal emulation. Thus André Félibien, in his work Le son de Philomathie, stages ut picture poëtas by means of a dialogue between two sisters, one blonde, the other brunette, the former expressing herself in verse, the latter in prose (published in 1683, reprinted as an appendix to book 10 of the Entretiens sur les vies et les ouvrages des plus excellents peintres anciens et modernes, 1666–88).

Ut picture poëtas did not limit itself to changing the image and status of the painter; it also transformed the definition of the painter by imposing on him the categories of poetic and rhetoric (inventio, dispositio) and by attributing a narrative goal to him. The doctrine of ut picture poëtas also triumphed in history painting, long considered the most noble kind of painting.

But very early on, reservations were expressed with regard to a comparison that subjected painting a little too much to the order of discourse. Thus Leonardo da Vinci preferred to describe poetry as blind painting rather than as speaking painting, to maintain the equality between the two arts. "Painting is a mute poetry and poetry a blind painting; both seek to imitate nature in accord with their means" (Traité de la peinture, trans. Chastel, 90). But Gottfried Lessing, in his Locrimou (1766), was the first to provide a systematic critique of the doctrine of ut picture poëtas. Disqualifying the very idea of a comparison between the arts, Lessing insists on their differences and the limits that separate them, as is shown explicitly by his book's subtitle: Locrimou: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry. The rejection of the parallel in the name of the argument for specificity was extensively developed in the nineteenth century, following Charles Baudelaire, by all the defenders of "modernism". This argument has played a major role in the contemporary analysis of art. In 1940, Clement Greenberg published in the Partisan Review an article, "Towards a New Locrimou," that was to become one of the main texts of "modernist" criticism. Appealing specifically to Lessing, Greenberg writes: "The avant-garde arts have in the last fifty years achieved a purity and a radical definition of their field of activity for which there is no previous example in the history of culture. The arts are therefore free of the 'legitimate' boundaries, and the free trade has been replaced by autarchy."(132).

Jacqueline Lichtenstein

BIBLIOGRAPHY


what does it mean to set two things face to face so that they correspond to each other? The effect of contrasted symmetry is emblematic of the Italian sonnet. First, there are the two quatrains. Not only is each symmetrical in itself, ab and then ba, but also and especially the two quatrains correspond to each other. The repetition of rhymes is not in itself very important. The essential fact is that this repetition is accompanied by a general schema in which everything tends toward symmetry: to comparatio. All of the variations of symmetry are then possible, whether the poet draws the symmetry from resemblance or from difference, from the adposition or from the contrapositum. Joachim Du Bellay’s L’Olive reintroduced the sonnet in France in 1550; the same year, Pierre Ronsard’s Odes broadened the practice. The imitation of the Pindaric model made it possible to make two segments and not merely two quatrains correspond to each other: strophe and antistrophe. In Greek poetics, the antistrophe corresponded to the strophe in having the same metric scheme; the chorus chanted the strophe while dancing in one direction, and the antistrophe while dancing in the opposite direction. In the Ronsardian ode, though the rhyme scheme is the same in the strophe and the antistrophe, the rhymes themselves are not the same, unlike those in the quatrains of the Italian sonnet. This underlines the essential fact. The symmetry has to do with the repetition of rhymes but with the will to symmetry: with the pure fact of counterpoint, of setting two elements beside one another, of comparing.

Francis Goyet

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Reprinted Amsterdam, Neth.: Haakert, 1905.

| COMPORTMENT |
“Comportment” corresponds to the French comportement, which, along with conduite, serves as the standard translations of the English “behavior.” Adjacent to “behavior,” “comportment” particularly emphasizes the objective, observable aspects of ways of acting, as reactions to the world and manifestations of internal dispositions. The article BEHAVIOR studies the differences between behaviorism and the psychology of comport(e)ment.

Regarding the relation between an organism and its environment, see AFFORDANCE, DISPOSITION.
On modalities of action, see ACT, AGENT, PRAxis. On the relation between the mind or the mental and the corporeal, see particularly CATHARSIS, CONSCIOUSNESS, DRIVE, FLESH, MALADIES, PATHICS, SOUL, UNCONSCIOUS.
On the specificity of the human, see HUMANITY; cf. ANIMAL, ERLEBEN.
>

| CONCEPT |
“Concept” is borrowed from the Latin conceptus, based on concipere (cum-capere, take entirely, contain). The conceptus is what one conceives in two senses of the term, the product of an internal gestation (the concept is mind’s fetus) and collection in a unit, generality: CONCEPTUS; cf. INTELLECT, INTELLECTUS, SOUL, UNDERSTANDING. On the difference between “nominalism” and “conceptualism,” see TERM.
Only the act of intellectual grasp subsists in Begriff, which corresponds to compréhension and comprehension, and belongs to the Stoic ideolc katolesis [katalekseth] (BEGRIFF, Box 1); see Begriff, where the development of terminologies of understanding is analyzed through German and English; cf. AUFHEBEN, MERKMAL, PERCEPTION.
Finally, Italian concetto has a very special status. It is an ingenious invention situated between aesthetic design and witticism; see CONCETTO; cf. ARGUTEZZA, DISEGNO, INGENIUM.
>

| CONCEPTUS (LATIN) |
ENGLISH CONCEPT
FRENCH CONCEPT
>

| BEGRIFF, CONCEPT, CONCETTO, and INTELLECT, INTELLECTUS, INTENTION, RÉPÉRÉNATION, SIGN, SIGNIFIER/SIGNIFIED, SPECIES, TÉMA, UNDERSTANDING, UNIVERSALS, WORD |
The Latin masculine noun conceptus (genitive: conceptus) came to occupy a distinctive place in Western philosophical terminology only in the second half of the thirteenth century. Meaning literally “fetus,” it had been used figuratively since Roman antiquity to designate an intellectual representation developing in the mind (Macrobius, Priscian). But it was with Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1225–74) that the noun conceptus became prominent and then spread among epistemologists. This rapid success can be explained by two factors. First is the ambiguity of the term that had previously been dominant, intellectus, which designated both the intellectual faculty and the units it represented—and sometimes even the meanings of words. Second and above all is the very semantics of conceptus: on the one hand, it denotes, in the literal sense, the product of internal gestation; on the other hand, its etymology (con-capere, “take together”) alludes to the collection of a plurality of elements in a single perception, that is, nothing less than the notion of generality. The internal production of thought on the one hand, and generality on the other: these are the two key components of conceptus. Though the later use of