Paul Jay Global Matters: The Transnational Turn in Literary Studies (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 2010)

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Difference, Multiculturalism, and the Globalizing of Literary Studies

Roughly every ten years the Modern Language Association publishes a book entitled *Introduction to Scholarship in Modern Languages and Literatures.* The series began in 1952 in order to clarify the "aims and methods currently adopted in the fields of modern language scholarship in America" (vii). These books, aimed at an audience of advanced students and academics, provide a snapshot of professional scholarship at the time of their publication, including a comprehensive overview of current theories, methodologies, key issues, and fields of study. The newest edition was published in 2007 under the general editorship of David G. Nicholls, director of book publications for the MLA. According to Nicholls, the new volume "seeks to provide an orientation for future scholars and to take stock of trends in the field over the past decade and a half" (vii). It does not take long to see what those trends are. Here is how Doris Sommer begins the opening essay, entitled "Language, Culture, and Society":

> To listen to the world now is to wake up from a romantic enchantment whose spell cast human subjects into vessels of one language, made language seem almost identical to nation, and made nation practically indistinguishable from state.... But today, *home* means not a here but a there, somewhere else, a loss for

migrant parents and a lack for the children.... By now, strangeness is the norm in big cities worldwide, where urban life is recovering the heterogeneous and dynamic qualities that once defined the medieval metropolis. (3)

What has broken the spell of the romantic enchantment of one home, one language, one nation, one stable place? "Globalization, . [the] push of peoples from poor countries to richer ones and the pull of market logic beyond national economies into regional and even broader arrangements" (3).[1] Beyond its effects on markets and economies, the push and pull of globalization, Sommer rightly points out, has also produced a "reshuffling [of] the cultural map of languages and literatures" (3). "Hardly any spaces are left to the tidy coincidence that some of us imagined between national culture and sovereign state," for countries and national cultures are interlocked by a web of markets and migrant workers, and they "depend on news and books written in one place, published in another, and marketed to a world of readers" (4). This means, according to Sommer, that "reading, writing, and speaking—verbal creativity in general—often cross national boundaries and thereby transgress the lines of proper (or proprietary) language" (4).[2]

The theme Sommer sketches out here is registered in the book's essays covering new developments in traditional fields including linguistics, poetics, textual scholarship, historical scholarship, interpretation, comparative literature, and translation studies, as well as in those dealing with newly established or emergent fields such as "cultural studies," "feminisms, genders, sexualities," "race and ethnicity," and "migrations, diasporas, and borders."[3] Taken together, these essays dramatize how, in an age of accelerating globalization, the profession of literary studies has shifted away from scholarly practices and critical paradigms rooted in the nation, the universality of experience, and a shared "humanity" that supposedly links all people and has increasingly turned its attention to the study of difference and diversity within newly transnationalized fields of study. What Sommer calls our "romantic enchantment" with the nation as a "home" for single literatures and languages (English, American, Spanish, Italian, Japanese, etc.) has been displaced by a new, more contemporary engagement with transnational spaces, hybrid identities, and subjectivities grounded in differences related to race, class, gender, and sexual orientation, and the study of how culture and its practices are shaped and reshaped in border zones and liminal spaces that transgress the clear lines between states and the more fuzzy ones between nations.

Sommer is certainly right that the transnational turn in literary and cultural studies can be traced in part to the accelerating forces of both economic and cultural globalization. Indeed, much of my book is taken up with an analysis and

assessment of the role globalization has played in fostering the kinds of changes Sommer discusses. However, I do not believe the transnationalizing of literary studies can be explained simply as a response to globalization, especially if we define globalization as a relatively contemporary phenomenon related to new technologies of travel and communication and the complex intersection of national economies and cultures. The transnationalizing of literary studies has to be understood as the effect of a more complicated set of intersecting forces dating back to the late 1960s, forces operating both within and outside the academy. They include the breakdown of a late nineteenth-century Arnoldian model of literary study grounded in an aestheticized, ahistorical, liberal-humanist set of assumptions about the nature and value of literature and culture; the development outside the academy of social and political movements, including the anti–Vietnam War movement, the civil rights movement, the women's movement, and the gay rights movement, and the rise of theoretical and critical practices within the academy dominated by a sustained and critical attention to difference (deconstruction; feminist and gender studies; work on race, class, and sexual orientation; and minority, multicultural, and postcolonial literatures). If we are going to understand how and why national paradigms for the study of literature have broken down in the age of globalization, it is important that we grasp the dramatic role this shift in our attention from sameness to difference has played in facilitating this transformation.

The Arnoldian model of literary studies, part of a more general response in the Victorian period among ruling class cultural arbiters to liberal reform and shifting class structures, was rooted in sameness. Students and professors were to study "the best that has been said and thought" from a position of disinterest, and "the best" was defined by criteria that were both ahistorical and universal. Following Matthew Arnold, the "best" literature is the literature that has managed to transcend the local, historical circumstances of its production and come to embody universal truths about reality and what it means to be human. The "best" literature links "men" because it engages that which is universal for all men. The best criticism is disinterested in the sense that it suspends our different interests and biases in the act of understanding the work as "in itself it really is." Literary texts have singular, essential natures; those with the "best" natures transcend differences and link us to something fundamentally human we all share, and so the canon we study comprises literary texts unified by what they have in common. The critique of this way of thinking about literature and its study is too well known to rehearse, but the main point has always been that Arnold's was a radically dehistoricizing, idealizing, and aestheticizing approach that provided cover for a masculine, interested, politicized conception of literary study masking its particular interests by calling them universal.[4]

What Sommer calls our "romantic enchantment" with sameness and singularity rooted in discrete national literatures evolved under this Arnoldian rubric, a rubric that operated pretty much intact until the 1960s. What happened then is also a familiar story but worth a brief review in the context of the argument I am making. It is a story, at bottom, about the shift from a critical rubric based on sameness to one based on difference. This shift developed both inside and outside the academy, though the forces intersected in dramatic fashion. Within the academy, the interest in difference developed narrowly under the influence, first, of structuralist theory and, later, and more broadly, the deconstructionism of Jacques Derrida and the work of Michel Foucault. Structuralism as a theory of signification taught us that meaning was produced not through sameness (some kind of inherent connection between words and things) but through difference, the play of binary oppositions in arbitrary systems of signification (where nature and culture or purity and hybridity do not have inherent meanings but rather derive their meanings from being set in a binary relationship). Meaning is not inherent but systematic, the product of a play of differences. Derridean deconstructionism developed as both an elaboration and a critique of structuralism. Deconstruction deepened our focus on the central role of difference in the production of meaning by insisting that the structuralist explanation of how meaning is produced was too neat, that in pointing out that a sign was made up of a signifier (a word or image) and a signified (the concept to which the word or image refers) structuralists developed a system that was deceptively self-contained. Language, Derrida argued, has a lot more play in it than the structuralists allowed for. What they called the signified was just another signifier that deferred meaning, hence the concept of *différance,* the idea that words always end up introducing difference and deferring meaning at the same time.

This approach to analyzing the production of meaning and its circulation was revolutionary, but for many critics it seemed focused too narrowly on textual matters and linguistic play. The work of Michel Foucault emerged as a kind of antidote to this focus on textual play, with critics like Hans Bertens arguing that where Derrida was narrowly interested in the role of difference in the operations of "textual power," Foucault was interested in "social power" (157). While this is a helpful distinction in general terms, it misses the extent to which Derrida was quite interested in social as well as textual power (Derrida subjects distinctions like that between textual and social power to deconstructive analysis), but Bertens also plays down the extent to which Foucault operated within a deconstructive framework deployed in the interests of historical, social, political, and institutional analyses. Foucault's classic treatment of sexuality, for example, models a certain way of doing theory that, as Jonathan Culler has argued, is nearly paradigmatic in terms of what theory *does.*[5] For Foucault, "sexuality" is a discursive term. We cannot understand very much about sexuality by trying to understand its "nature," without studying how it has been constructed historically, discursively, and ideologically in specific cultures at specific times. The difference between heterosexuality and homosexuality is not a difference of inherent natural qualities but a difference instituted and regulated by discourses about sexuality that are historically embedded. We now regularly make the same argument about literature and race and gender that Foucault made about sexuality. None of these things exists in and of themselves. Literature, race, gender, and sexuality are defined and regulated by discursive regimes based on difference that operate ideologically and through institutions to both enable and restrict certain forms of agency. The very nature of "truth" in any instance is not immanent but based on difference, and regimes that regulate and police the truth (formal and informal) all operate by enforcing behaviors and identities associated with socially and historically articulated values based on the interests of those who wield the power to enforce them.

Foucault employs a deconstructive theoretical framework that shifts our attention from so-called inherent qualities and sameness to the productive role of difference in a critical landscape more engaged with social, cultural, and political forms than was early deconstruction. This is why his work has become so central to more political and historical forms of criticism developing in his wake. However, these forms of criticism (feminist, new historicist, African American, postcolonial, gay, lesbian, and queer, etc.) would not have been possible without the wider political movements I mentioned earlier. All of these movements contributed to the accelerating study of difference in literary and cultural studies and in the humanities generally, but, perhaps more important, they transformed the demographic makeup of the student population and then the professoriate in ways that have become nearly revolutionary. Indeed, it is the intersection of these demographic changes with theoretical innovations in our understanding of the key role difference makes in the production and regulation of meaning that set the stage for the transnationalizing of literary studies. In this regard the social and political movements I mentioned earlier turned out to be crucial. The civil rights movement opened up colleges and universities to an African American population who had been systematically excluded from higher education, as the Chicana/o movement did for Latino/a students and professors. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 lifted restrictive immigration policies against Asian, Latin American, Mexican, and other non-Anglo populations and helped fuel a demographic transformation of the United States.[6] The women's movement began in the late 1960s to bring significant numbers of women into professional schools and graduate programs, and the gay rights movement brought a whole range of formerly ignored issues and authors (and students and professors) into

the classroom. By the late1970s the student body had changed, but so too had the professoriate. With an increasing number of minority, women, and openly gay faculty members came a transformation in the texts taught and the issues foregrounded. This did not happen as part of someone's political agenda. It was the predictable effect of dramatic demographic changes produced by social justice movements that began in the street and ended in the courts. The academy today now reflects the population of the United States—and its disparate interests and experiences—much more than it did in, say, the mid-1960s.

With these changes, the study of different literatures (African American, Latina/o, Native American, and Asian American, etc.), and the representation of difference *in* literature began to systematically complicate scholarship in modern languages and literatures and to transform what it meant to get a "literary" education. The guiding principle of literary studies—that the literature we ought to study gets its significance from its engagement with universal human experiences that transcend historical circumstances—got turned nearly on its head. The imperative to *historicize* the texts we study, to pay attention to the material circumstances of both their production and consumption, and to recognize the *differences* historical and material circumstances make in what we think of as literature and how we engage with it as students and scholars, became central to the enterprise of literary studies. Formerly marginal texts by women and "minority" writers began to get sustained attention; the literary canon, in the first stages of these changes, became productively complicated by the inclusion of these texts and, at a later stage, began to disappear altogether as the principle for organizing the texts we study. At the same time, narrow attention to the formal, aesthetic, and linguistic characteristics of literary texts became complicated by increasing attention to the ways in which they reflect, and reflect on, experiences and identities determined by the social and ideological forces of gender, class, race, sexual orientation, and migration across national borders.

While at the height of the so-called culture wars critics of this transformation complained that literary studies specifically and the humanities in general had become hijacked by the Left and politicized (as if traditional forms of literary study were not always political themselves), something much more complicated and valuable was happening. The dominant paradigm for identifying what counted as "literature" was changing, and the range of issues engaged by literary scholars was shifting dramatically away from a narrow aesthetic basis to a broadly social and even anthropological one. The literature we studied, wrote about, and taught became more representative and thus more complicated. The older, unitary, aestheticized, ahistorical, and universalizing paradigm for literary studies that developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries collapsed under the imperative to understand literature as a multicultural

object of knowledge full of social and cultural information and expressive of a whole range of different experiences and identities. By the mid-1970s the unitary model, which had framed literary studies in English in wholly national terms as "British" and "American," had become complicated in extraordinarily rich ways. The case in American studies, for example, was dramatic. In a short period of time the narrow canon of American writers that was used to establish and then control the study of "American" literature in the early twentieth century exploded, and with it went the unitary model for study, which saw literature as embodying an "American" identity regulated by the pressures of assimilation and sameness. A wave of African American, Chicana/o, Native American, and Asian American scholars joined with others to produce whole new fields of study that challenged first the hegemony of Anglo-American literature in the U.S. canon and then the national model of American studies itself. This should not be seen in negative terms as the *fragmentation* of coherence in literary studies but as a broad and socially valuable corrective to flawed ways of making choices about what ought to be studied in higher education. In its earlier guise, "American" literary studies was "American" in only the narrowest sense of the term, comprising literature produced largely by white males, first in New England and then later in the Midwest, the South, and the West. In fact, as critics began to point out in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the term "America" had been hijacked by "American" studies in the interests of defining a very limited geographical and historical framework for the work it did. As numerous critics began to point out, the Americas comprise all of North, Central, and South America, and a truly "American" studies ought to focus in complex ways on literary production across the borders of these disparate but linked locations.[7] By the mid-1980s "American" literary studies, under the productive pressure of Chicana/o, African American, Asian, and Native American critics had begun to transform itself into a study of the literatures of the Americas, a practice in which U.S. literatures became engaged with those produced along the U.S., Canadian, Mexican, and Caribbean borders, specifically, in the Americas, generally, and among writers belonging to the African (and now South Asian) diaspora. This change was so dramatic that by 2004, Shelly Fisher Fishkin, president of the American Studies Association, devoted her long presidential address to cataloguing what she called the transnational turn in American studies.[8] The story here is clear. As long as the study of "American" literature stuck to the analysis of Anglo-American texts and traditions it remained a scholarly enterprise focused narrowly on a British-U.S. axis of exchange in which the experience of mostly white male authors defined the norm. But once the study of literature became engaged with texts by writers both male and female of African, Native, Asian, Mexican, and Latin American descent, the roots *and* the routes of American

literature, and the histories of those who both produced and populated its texts, became a transnational affair.[9]

Many of these changes paralleled the rise of postcolonial studies, a development made possible in part by the general opening up of literary studies to the analysis of formerly marginal texts by minority writers I have been discussing. That is, the evolving study of Native American, African, Asian, and Latino/a texts in the United States and elsewhere in the 1970s and 1980s helped set the stage for postcolonial studies. I address this at length in later chapters about this field, its status as a transnational practice, and its relationship to globalization, but a few key points are worth making here.

As a practice that simultaneously analyzed texts produced outside of Western Europe in former colonies *and* subjected the history of British literature to an analysis of its engagement with imperialism and colonialism (Edward Said's *Culture and Imperialism* is a key example), postcolonial studies had the effect of undermining the Eurocentricity of literary studies in the West *and* subjecting a European literary tradition to historical and material critiques that dramatically transformed traditional critical discourse. Here again, the shift was away from sameness (under the older traditional paradigms of comparative literature, that is, the question of what *united* literatures from disparate locations) to difference—racial, class, and cultural. Like the analyses of minority and multicultural texts ushered in by the rise of African, Native, Asian, and Hispanic American studies, postcolonial studies organized itself around the study of difference, focused attention on alternative histories and experiences, and, perhaps most important, required engagement with texts and issues that cut across national boundaries.

Postcolonial studies has to a significant degree been the offspring of the very diasporic formations it studies (though of course it does not limit itself by any means to such study). Here again shifting demographics are as important as shifting critical practices. The postcolonial *period,* central to the history of globalization, has been characterized by displacement, migration, and mobility that helped transform both the student bodies and the professoriate of Western academic institutions. Postcolonial literature enters the curriculum and spurs new scholarly work in the West in part as the result of this mobility. With migration to U.S. and western European academic institutions of scholars and critics having roots in postcolonial countries, and with growing diasporic communities (Africa, South Asian, Asian, etc.) feeding the student body of these institutions, came a whole new generation of students and professors dedicated to expanding the geographical scope of literary studies and, with it, the identities, experiences, and histories it encompasses.

The replacement of a unitary, ahistorical, and universalizing model for literary studies with one focused on difference and influenced by the rise of

minority, multicultural, and postcolonial studies happened well before anyone in the academy started talking much about globalization. Globalization, in the sense Doris Sommer invokes it, becomes central to the transnationalizing of literary studies because it *merges* with the kinds of changes I have been discussing. Economic and cultural globalization have both worked to dramatically accelerate the kind of demographic changes that are central to changes in critical and scholarly practices in literary studies. All of these changes have converged in ways that have led to the transnationalizing of literary studies. The opening of U.S. and other Western academic institutions to minority and postcolonial students, the movement of some of those students into the professoriate, and the ways in which their work has challenged and to a significant degree overturned older critical practices has transformed what used to be a largely nationalist enterprise into an increasingly transnational practice, whether measured in terms of the transnational turn in American or modernist studies,[10] the impact of postcolonial studies on British literary studies, or the more general sense in which the curriculum in English, Romance languages, and comparative literary studies departments has complicated national models by the attention we now pay to the porousness of borders and to cross-cultural, transnational, and even postnational experiences.

Globalization has thus played an important part in the transnationalizing of literary studies, but it is not the singular cause of this dramatic change. Rather, the forces of economic and cultural globalization outside of the academy, and the development of theories and practices for its study *inside* the academy, have dramatically accelerated a longer history of change. While popular public discussion of globalization can be dated from the publication in June 2000 of Thomas L. Friedman's *The Lexus and the Olive Tree,* globalization had already become a popular topic among academics in a number of fields, where, since the early 1990s, scholars in economics, political science, sociology, film and communications, and cultural and literary studies had been writing about its effects.[11] By the time Friedman published his book, the study of globalization had already migrated from departments of economy and political science through sociology departments and cultural studies programs into the field of literary studies. What started out as a relatively narrow field dedicated to tracking the rise of an increasingly global network of economic relations dominated by transnational corporations had steadily evolved into a globalized field of cultural studies, as scholars and critics in a range of disciplines in the humanities and social sciences came to recognize that commodities, currencies, and cultures are inseparable, that the globalization of economies brings with it the globalization of cultures, and that, indeed, it is nearly impossible to figure out where economic globalization stops and cultural globalization begins.

Academic studies of globalization have increasingly turned to the question of its general impact on the university, and more specifically to the question of how globalization is changing the nature and scope of work within the disciplines. One of the first books to do this was *The University in Ruins* (1998) by Bill Readings. In it Readings develops a trenchant analysis of the impact globalization had on the North American university in the last decades of the twentieth century, focusing on how the demise of the nation-state affected the humanities in general and literary studies in particular. He reminds us that the rise of the modern university is intimately connected to the evolution of the modern nation-state, that the needs of nationalism and the operations of the university were deeply connected from the outset. In Readings's view, the modern university, which evolved under Wilhelm von Humboldt at the University of Berlin beginning in 1810 and was later adopted in the United States (7), always had a "national cultural mission" (3), in part because the modern idea of "culture" and the modern idea of the nation developed in close relation to one another (12), so much so that the "university . . . has historically been the primary institution of national culture in the modern nation-state" (12).

In the view of Readings, however, globalization began very quickly to put an end to all this. With the contemporary shift from national economies to a global one, with the proliferation of electronic media able to transmit information instantaneously across national boundaries, and with the power of transnational corporations rivaling that of the nation-state, the university is undergoing a profound reorientation. "The University," Readings writes, "is becoming a different kind of institution, one that is no longer linked to the destiny of the nation-state by virtue of its role as a producer, protector, and inculcator of an idea of national culture" (3). Because "the process of economic globalization brings with it the relative decline of the nation-state" the university is undergoing a fundamental reorientation away from serving the needs of the nation-state toward serving the needs of transnational capital (3).

This change is having a particularly striking impact on the humanities in general and on the study of English in particular. The modern university grew out of the values of the Enlightenment and was committed to the cultivation of character, an aesthetic education, and the development in its students of the capacity for philosophical critique. The central role of philosophy in this enterprise, and the later importance of a literary education as formulated by Matthew Arnold, who saw literature as central to his programmatic effort to use culture in England as a bulwark against a rising working class, underscore the important role English played in the modern university. "The current crisis of the University in the West" in the age of globalization, Readings insists, "proceeds from a fundamental shift in its social role and internal systems, one which means that the centrality of the traditional humanistic disciplines to the life of the University is no longer assured" (3), and that the role of English in particular is becoming radically transformed. In the United States, English has traditionally been part of a curricular world organized along the lines of a political map, the borders of which have neatly duplicated those of modern nation-states. If the conventional structures of literary study (English, French, Spanish, Italian, German, etc.) have been transparently nationalist, they mirror the aesthetic ideology of literary studies, one that can be traced to the linkage among nation, race, and literature forged in nineteenth-century Europe by writers like Hippolyte-Adolphe Taine and Matthew Arnold. In the United States Ralph Waldo Emerson and Walt Whitman articulated the need for a national literature decades before it became incorporated in the curricula of American universities. As Peter Carafiol and others have demonstrated, the structure of American literary studies in universities in the United States has always been informed by a broadly nationalist ideal.[12] While this ideal was based on forging an aesthetic and ideological consensus about culture and identity grounded in a limited set of texts unified around certain themes and values, we have seen how contemporary criticism became increasingly preoccupied with difference in ways that undermine the neat, superficial cultural homogeneity informing the study of national literatures.

This interest in difference, connected as it is to the study of minority, multicultural, postcolonial, and transnational literatures, was dramatically accelerated by the forces of globalization. It was also paralleled by a significant increase in the production of literature written in English outside the United States and Great Britain. As the locations from which English literature is produced have multiplied, the rationale for a nation-state model governing its study has appeared increasingly anachronistic. There is an obvious synchronicity between the transnational production of English and the transnationalizing of its study. The remarkable explosion of English literature produced outside Britain and the United States in the last decades of the twentieth century made it clear that "English" was becoming defined less by a nation than by a language. The globalization of English from this point of view is not a theoretical formulation or a political agenda developed by radicals in the humanities to displace the canon. It is a simple fact of contemporary history. English literature in the age of globalization is increasingly transnational, whether written by cosmopolitan writers like Salman Rushdie, Derek Walcott, Zadie Smith, Arundhati Roy, Junot Díaz, or Nadine Gordimer or by a host of lesser-known writers working in their home countries or in diasporic communities around the world, from Europe and Africa to the Caribbean and North America. For this reason, English literature is becoming increasingly more difficult to understand without recognizing its

relationship to a complicated web of transnational histories linked to the historical processes of globalization.

These changes, coming as they have in the wake of significant transformations in literary studies already ushered in by poststructuralist, feminist, and postcolonial theories (among others), have been profoundly controversial. Critics on the right have lamented the so-called dominance of theory and have complained about the politicization of literary studies. But even some progressive critics such as the late Edward Said and Masao Miyoshi have lamented the combined effects of theory and globalization on the humanities, complaining that it has led to intellectual fragmentation and created a proliferation of what appear to be largely uncoordinated efforts to create new subdisciplines and reorganize traditional curricula and programs. Clearly, the unprecedented explosion of theorizing about literary language, interpretation, textuality, authorship, and reading since the late 1960s has played an important role in overturning conventional approaches to literary study in the classroom, in criticism, and in the curriculum. But nothing has quite had the kind of transformative effect on literary studies that globalization has had. This effect has all but undone the traditional Eurocentrism of literary studies in the West. As Edward Said put it in "Globalizing Literary Study" (2001), "economic and political globalization . . . since the end of the cold war . . . has been the enveloping context in which literary studies are undertaken":

> The gradual emergence in the humanities of confused and fragmented paradigms of research, such as those available through the new fields of postcolonial, ethnic, and other particularistic or identity-based study, reflects the eclipse of the old authoritative, Eurocentric models and the new ascendancy of a globalized, postmodern consciousness from which, as Benita Parry and others have argued, the gravity of history has been excised. (66)

Said was obviously less than sanguine about these developments. Like Readings, he took the "deterioration of the position of the humanities" in the university to be a direct result of the "catastrophic effects of the global situation" (66). The end of Eurocentrism, in his view, has simply left us with a hodge-podge of critical approaches rooted in identity politics and shorn of a historical consciousness. In our rush to celebrate a "purely academic version of multiculturalism with which many people in the real world of ethnic division, conflict and chauvinism would find it difficult to identify," we miss paying attention to "sites of resistance to the terrible negative effects of globalization" (66). The worst of these effects for Said, beyond even the poverty and political divisions that attend globalization, is the "dominance of the United States as the only superpower left" (66).[13]

This dominance carries over into the realm of academic politics. Those of us who have worried about the extent to which global studies represents the recolonization of "Other" literatures by Western academics are concerned that the field of transnational literary studies is coming to be dominated by a single superpower. From this point of view, globalization represents a return of Western colonization, as postnational literary studies hitches itself to the globalization bandwagon and begins to subjugate the literature of the Other to its own paradigms. In this scenario, Eurocentrism is repackaged as globalization, and multiculturalism gives way to an inevitably leveling kind of cosmopolitanism. Moreover, to the extent that "English" as both a language and literature is privileged in discussions about globalization, it seems that the rich complexity of literature and cultural production under globalization is in danger of being subordinated to the powerful forces of this dominant discipline.[14]

Miyoshi has echoed Said's concerns. Indeed, he warns in "'Globalization' and the University" (1998) against the dangers of academic work in the humanities and social sciences becoming complicit with globalization.[15] He insists that the autonomy of faculty in the research university in general and the humanities in particular has been compromised by the kind of "academic capitalism" (39) that fuels globalization, and that changes we superficially celebrate as progressive—a focus, for example, on "particularity" and "diversity" (40)—in fact support the needs of global capitalism. In Miyoshi's view, the ideal of "multiplicity and difference" ends up endorsing economic globalization (40). Where others see a value in focusing on diversity and difference Miyoshi sees a debilitating strategy of division and fragmentation. "If the strategy of division and fragmentation is not contained and moderated with the idea of a totality," he writes, "it may very well lose its initial purpose and end up paradoxically in universal marginalization" (42). Miyoshi sketches out his position in a masterful, condensed overview of the impact of poststructuralist theory on concepts of universality and difference.[16] His main complaint about poststructuralist theory is that its antifoundationalist critique of universals left little room for the kind of totalizing perspective normally associated with Marxism. This development, in his view, began with the rejection of essence by Jean-Paul Sartre and other existentialists, and then became extended in the structuralism of Claude Lévi-Strauss (fueled, as Miyoshi sees it, by an "abandonment of totality as well as universalism" [41]). Miyoshi sees the value of Lévi-Strauss's work on cultural difference in its break with a "long-established tradition of Eurocentricity" in Western theory, but he isolates a number of problems with it. First, it tends to focus on cultures as diverse and therefore lacking common characteristics and traits, which he insists leads to a kind of "cognitive relativism" (41). Second, influenced by Saussurean linguistics, the "world" and "history" become understood reductively in textual

and narratological terms, while "truth is assumed to be unrepresentable" (42). It follows, then, that "every culture or age has its own unique terms and discourses, which are thus judged incommensurable across the cultural and historical borders" (42). Finally, subjectivity and agency under the system of Lévi-Strauss are impossibly fragmented and ineffective in terms of mounting resistance to dominant forces. In Miyoshi's view, Lévi-Strauss leaves us with a world in which individual subjectivity is determined by discrete fragmented cultures, individual agency is "disallowed," and "political engagement is impossible" (42). Finally, "because of this erasure of political agency, the diversity of cultures paradoxically surrenders to the hegemonic center once again—very much as in the so-called global 'borderless' economy" (42).

Once this basic approach to culture and subjectivity took hold, according to Miyoshi's narrative, universality and totality became demonized "in favor of difference, particularity, incommensurability, and structure" (42). "Totalizing concepts" such as "humanity, civilization, history, and justice," along with "subtotalities" such as "region" and "nation," were rejected, and all "foundational ideas and concepts" came to be understood as thoroughly "historical and cultural constructs" (42). Miyoshi mounts a breathtaking condemnation of the effects of poststructuralist theory on thinking about domination and liberation, and the agency required for both, a condemnation based on his conviction that "an individual, a group, or a program requires a totality in which to position itself" if it is to mount an effective critique of anything (42). Such an effective critique, in his view, has been thoroughly compromised in the United States by the discourse of multiculturalism and a stress on identity politics, both of which, he asserts, have fractured and fragmented various oppressed populations in ways that have actually undermined political agency. Both multiculturalism and identity politics have what Miyoshi calls the "imprimatur" of the "philosophy of difference" (which runs from Sartre and Lévi-Strauss through Derrida, Foucault, feminism, and African American theory) and they have in his view contributed to a debilitating "multiplicity of perspectives, specializations and qualifications" that are "intensified by the rage for differentiation," particularly in humanities departments (46). Miyoshi sees all this as much worse than the New Criticism: "Worse than the fetishism of irony, paradox, and complexity a half century ago, the cant of hybridity, nuance, and diversity now pervades the humanities" so that they are "thoroughly disabled to take up the task of opposition, resistance, and confrontation" (48).[17]

Said and Miyoshi raise a number of challenging questions about the relationship between globalization and academic work in the humanities and social sciences. But are things really as bad as they claim? Is globalization itself simply the newest and most efficient agent of capitalist exploitation yet developed by

the West, a process that relentlessly homogenizes and Westernizes the cultures it entangles in its net? Is the attention we pay in the academy to literatures and cultures formerly excluded by Eurocentrism corrupted by its association with a Western commitment to difference, diversity, multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism that has already been cunningly co-opted within the university by English departments and outside of it by capitalism? And must we, along with Said and Miyoshi, think of globalization and postcolonial studies, multiculturalism, gender studies, the study of "ethnic" literatures and other approaches that grow out of identity politics and a general attention to difference as hopelessly compromised and fragmenting?

I don't think so. The dangers these two critics warn of are real, but I want to offer a more hopeful narrative than those presented by Said and Miyoshi. In the first place, there is nothing new about "fragmentation" in literary studies. Fragmentation actually has a long history in literary studies and is integral to its development. Whether we consider the steady fragmentation in English of the "canon" from British texts to British and American texts to "global English," or from texts authored by white men to texts authored by women and minority writers, or whether we consider the historical proliferation of critical approaches ranging from philology, historicism, New Criticism, structuralism, deconstruction, feminism, *New* Historicism, postcolonialism, ecocriticism, and the like, we see a discipline that has been constantly fragmenting and then reforming itself. In literary studies, as in most other academic disciplines, "coherence" and "fragmentation" are interdependent. Coherence comes as a benefit of fragmentation. It isn't an alternative to it.

We need to be careful not to set up a historical view of literary studies in which a monolithic and coherent Eurocentrism remained dominant until postmodern fragmentation set in, a fragmentation specifically linked to the debilitating effects of globalization and complicit with forms of multiculturalism hijacked by companies like Benetton in ads that are transparently commercial. This historical narrative is much too simplistic. Although literary studies in the West has been, as Said pointed out, dominated by Eurocentrism, disciplinary coherence within this framework broke down and reorganized itself with remarkable regularity during the whole of the twentieth century.[18] The current shift in literary studies, which Said and a host of contemporary critics across the ideological spectrum characterize as a new kind of fragmentation, simply represents another instance in which one form of coherence gives way to another as the discipline continues to evolve. Earlier instances of this so-called fragmentation often occurred along narrow lines related primarily to methodology (philological, rhetorical, formalist, historical, structuralist, poststructuralist, etc.), whereas recent forms of fragmentation are related more to political and social movements (poststructuralist

Marxism, feminism, gay and lesbian studies, postcolonial studies, African American and border studies, and now, globalization studies). However, the apparent shift—from a postcolonial to a global perspective—is quite consistent with the way the discipline of literary studies has developed over the whole course of the twentieth century.

Like Said's, Miyoshi's concerns about globalization and the humanities are often compelling, but ultimately his argument is misguided and reductive. As I noted, his absolute distinction between particularity and totality is so rigid as to be counterproductive. He is certainly right that a preoccupation with difference has been the hallmark of critical and cultural theory since the late 1960s, but it is only from the perspective of someone who wants to maintain an outmoded collectivist imperative for social change that this preoccupation would appear politically conservative. To real political conservatives multiculturalism and identity politics (especially feminist, queer, and minority) appear central to the agenda of radical leftists both inside and outside the academy. Surely both of these positions fail to acknowledge the extent to which multiculturalism and identity politics have contributed, however awkwardly, to the improvement of social justice in the United States and elsewhere.[19] While Miyoshi wants to dismiss the important lessons poststructuralism has taught us about the reductive impulses and political dangers of totalizing systems and master narratives, it seems to me imperative we resist his dismissal of the local and the particular and his nostalgia for a manufactured essentialism no matter how progressive its political aims might be. The idea that particularity and totality are absolutely opposed to one another ought to be tempered by the recognition that they exist in dialectical relationship with each other. It may be that attention to particular differences makes it more difficult to see the total picture, but the kind of totality or universality Miyoshi endorses more often than not reduces, obscures, ignores, or rejects the legitimacy of local and particular differences when they threaten the constructed coherence of a totalizing master narrative. It may be better to run the risk of making a fetish of local differences than erasing them in the interests of a larger, totalized good.[20]

Miyoshi's wholesale condemnation of critics interested in multiculturalism and globalization is much too sweeping and flies in the face of other critics, who lament the politicization of work in the humanities and social sciences by professors they associate with the political left. For this reason it seems like an odd time to complain, as Miyoshi has done, that the humanities are in "retreat" from "intellectual and political resistance" (40). We live in a time when the humanities have been hammered by conservative and moderate critics alike for becoming mired in a pedagogy dominated by a left-leaning intellectual and political resistance that has supposedly compromised the autonomy and objectivity of academic inquiry (see, for example, David Horowitz's "Academic Bill of Rights"). Miyoshi's position begs the question of how the academy can be both captive to the Left's agenda of intellectual and political resistance and at the same time complicit with the ideology and needs of global capitalism.

Miyoshi offers helpful caution with regard to the relationship between academic scholarship and globalization. However, he gets himself in the somewhat paradoxical position of criticizing the use of globalization as a framework for rethinking work in the humanities and in area studies while at the same time calling for a global "all areas" point of view that eschews particularity and difference in the interests of producing new metanarratives. He insists that "the academics' work in this marketized world is to learn and watch problems in as many sites as they can keep track of, not in any specific areas, nations, races, ages, genders, or cultures, but in all areas, nations, races, ages, genders, and cultures. In other words, far from abandoning the master narratives, the critics and scholars in the humanities must restore the public rigor of the metanarratives" (49). From this point of view our work should ignore the enormous body of cautionary literature about master narratives, play down distinctions between specific areas and regions, and avoid anything but an overtly critical and persistently hostile scholarly posture toward globalization. Except for his antipathy toward global capitalism, it is never clear why a "totalized" system along the lines Miyoshi calls for could not be built around a historicized analysis and critique of the forces and effects of globalization. After all, one does not have to endorse globalization to study how its effects are having a totalizing effect on virtually every sphere of human endeavor. It is awkward to see Miyoshi on the one hand calling for a systematic macro approach to cultural analysis and on the other rejecting the study of globalization as one of its key components. It seems to me that both Said and Miyoshi are wrong to worry that the changes in literary and cultural studies I have been discussing in this chapter represent fragmentation or a loss of coherence. Rather, they represent the development of a new coherence (which will always be marked by some contradictions and be tentative by nature) in which histories of mobility, migration, and displacement get connected with a study of how cultures and identities and the politics that shape them develop across formerly fixed and overly narrow national geographies. Miyoshi's judgment that work on local and particular identities is debilitating because it disallows a collective perspective misses how fictions of the collective have served forces that have dominated and oppressed people who are marked *by* the collective as different. We are living in a period in which the historical value of attention to particular identities constituted by differences related to gender, ethnicity, race, and sexual orientation ought to seem clear.

While I have been arguing that there are problems with the positions taken by critics like Said and Miyoshi, they both raise a number of pressing questions worth exploring. What, in fact, is globalization, and when did it begin? How do the histories of colonialism and postcolonialism fit into the history of globalization? What kind of relationship obtains between the economic and cultural forces of globalization? In what sense do the discourses of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism represent viable responses to managing difference in an age of increasing globalization? Or do they, as Miyoshi feared, simply feed the interests of an increasingly dominant system of global capital? What impact will the increasing attention to what we call global culture have on our study of literature in general and English literature in particular? And, finally, are the forms of personal and cultural hybridity produced by globalization destabilizing and to be lamented, or are they inevitable and potentially liberating? To begin to answer these questions it will help to first sort through some competing definitions of globalization, briefly exploring how the field of globalization studies developed before it migrated to cultural and literary studies, and asking ourselves how we ought to conceptualize globalization as we think about its relationship to literary and cultural production and its impact on the university.

2

What Is Globalization?

How we define globalization depends on how we *historicize* globalization. Many critics argue that globalization is a contemporary historical phenomenon defined by a dramatic kind of rupture from the past in which the flow of economic and cultural forces have swamped the borders of nation-states, that the development of electronic media forms in particular have changed entirely the nature of social, cultural, economic, and political relations. From this point of view globalization is a dramatically new phenomenon. Other critics, however, argue that globalization actually has a long history, that globalization in our own time should be seen as a significant acceleration of forces that have been in play since at least the sixteenth century and that are not simply Western in their origin. I endorse this view and believe we need to find a historically and theoretically sound way to reconcile the histories of trade, exploration, conquest, colonization, decolonization, and postcolonialism with the long history of globalization.

I want to examine in particular recent debates about postcolonialism and globalization because they foreground what is at stake in how we historicize globalization. While some critics fear that globalization studies threaten to replace a politically incisive form of critique (postcolonial studies) with a generalized and

largely celebratory one, I believe this is a short-sighted and inaccurate assessment and that globalization and postcolonialism actually have a dialectical relationship with each other. The histories of the two are inseparable, and the transnational turn in literary and cultural studies will benefit greatly from our ability to articulate both the historical and the methodological relationship between them.

We also need to be careful about how we theorize the relationship between economic and cultural forms of globalization. In reviewing the spirited debate among critics about whether globalization is an economic or a cultural phenomenon, and the related argument about whether the study of globalization ought to be materialist or cultural, I take the position that a narrow exclusivist position on either side is wrong, that the very categories of "materialist" and "cultural" set up a false distinction. The process we call globalization is characterized by the *conflation* of cultural and economic forms. When commodities travel, culture travels, and cultural forms are nothing if not commodities. The study of globalization, therefore, requires an approach that is neither narrowly culturalist nor materialist but rather operates with an understanding of the interdependence and interrelationship of the two. This is an argument I will sketch out below but take up in more detail in chapter 3.

Historicizing Globalization

How we define globalization indeed depends on how it is historicized. If we think of globalization as comprising a set of economic, cultural, and political developments facilitated by the explosion of dramatically new electronic and digital technologies of communication and commercial activity, it will appear to be a contemporary, Western, postmodern, and postnational phenomenon. However, if we think of globalization more broadly as characterized by a complex set of intercultural encounters facilitated by successive historical shifts in forms of travel, communication, exploration, conquest, and trade that periodically accelerate in ways keyed to technological, economic, and political change, then globalization in our own time will appear to be the extension of relationships with a long and complex history both within and outside the West. While many journalists and critics think about globalization in the first way, I believe it is important to think of globalization in longer historical terms, not so much because it is more *accurate* than seeing globalization as a contemporary phenomenon (both positions have their merits), but because it affords us a more nuanced historical perspective regarding the development of globalization in our own time. To think of globalization as strictly a contemporary phenomenon requires that we define it in terms of a set of radically new developments related to technologies

of travel and communication that in fact have a long history running back at least to the sixteenth century, if not earlier. The short view of globalization foregrounds the emergence of electronic, largely digital, forms of communication as a kind of rupture, and it sees new forms of physical mobility and the emergence of a global economy as singular and dramatically new forces that have fundamentally remade the world we live in. This way of defining globalization is valuable for the attention it pays to the role new media, communication systems, forms of travel, and economic relations and their governance have played in the contemporary transformation of personal experience and social relations. But it underplays how these changes are related to older, more incremental ones that have a long history and that call our attention to how brief the era of the nation-state has been and to patterns of continuity between the past and our own time.

A good example of the argument that globalization represents a historical rupture facilitated by dramatically new developments in media forms, financial relations, and ideologies is the now classic one Arjun Appadurai made in *Modernity at Large* (1996). For Appadurai, globalization is characterized by "disjunction" and "difference" (27). He postulates a "Global Now" (2) and argues that we have in the "past few decades" experienced "a general rupture in the tenor of intersocietal relations," a "dramatic and unprecedented break between tradition and modernity," indeed, a break "with all sorts of pasts" (3). This rupture takes "media and migration as its two major" causes, both of which have a profound effect on what he calls "*the work of the imagination* as a constitutive feature of modern subjectivity" (3). Appadurai's version of globalization is defined by the eruption of electronic media and the "new resources and new disciplines for the construction of imagined selves and imagined worlds" this media affords (3). It is about speed, immediacy, and convergence, the collapse of what David Harvey popularized as the time-space ratio, the "immediate" communication of textual and video information in a way that collapses the effect of distance, the circulation of bytes of information and "the immediacy of their absorption into public discourse" (3). This kind of immediacy is, for Appadurai, characterized by a set of "global flows" he characterizes using the metaphor of landscapes: ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes, and ideoscapes (33). For Appadurai the landscapes of ethnicity, the media, technology, finance, and ideology have all ruptured into a complex set of global flows that have set loose contexts for the imaginative reformation of subjectivity across the borders of nation-states. While I believe this vision of globalization as a generally liberatory set of processes has some merit, I will be arguing in chapter 3 that it fails to account for how the unevenness of economic development under globalization limits opportunities for the kind of reformation of subjectivity Appadurai describes. What

I want to stress here is the theory of historical rupture that characterizes his definition of globalization. While Appadurai gives a nod to the historicity of some of these changes, he insists that we understand globalization as an absolute break with the past. "People, machinery, money, images and ideas now follow increasingly nonisomorphic paths... the sheer speed, scale, and volume of each of these flows are now so great that the disjunctures have become central to the politics of global culture" (37).

Appadurai's approach to globalization emphasizes rupture, speed, convergence, and disjunction at the expense of historicizing the forces that have led to this rupture in the first place, and it stands in contrast to other approaches that see globalization as a long historical process. It is important to recognize the stakes for literary and cultural studies in these contrasting approaches. If globalization is seen as a fundamentally postmodern phenomenon then it would seem limited as an explanatory paradigm to contemporary (and emerging) literatures and cultures. But if globalization is a long historical process that dramatically accelerated in the last half of the twentieth century, then the globalization of literary studies cannot restrict itself to this contemporary acceleration.[1] In particular, literature's relation to the processes of globalization as they manifest themselves in a variety of historical periods—indeed, literature's facilitation of economic and cultural globalization—is becoming a potentially important field of study that can get short-circuited if we historicize globalization as a strictly postmodern eruption.

While Appadurai aligns globalization with late modernity, Roland Robertson, a proponent of the idea that globalization has a long history, argues that the process actually predates modernity and has been evolving since at least the fifteenth century. He divides the history of globalization into five phases: "germinal" (1400–1750), "incipient" (1750–1875), "take-off" (1875–1925), "struggle for hegemony" (1925–69), and finally "uncertainty," which runs from 1969 to the present (25–31). The key moments for Robertson in this long evolution toward globalization include the collapse of Christendom; the development of maps and maritime travel; the rise of the nation-state, global exploration, colonialism, the creation of citizenship, passports, diplomacy and the entire paraphernalia of international relations; the rise of international communication and mass migration; the founding of organizations such as the League of Nations and the United Nations; the outbreak of world wars; and the exploration of space and a developing sense that communities based on race, ethnicity, gender, sexual preference, and so on, cut across national and state boundaries.

Robertson's approach to dating globalization is at odds with that of Appadurai and other postmodern theorists such as Anthony Giddens and David Harvey. Giddens links globalization much more specifically to modernity—in particular, to the solidification of the nation-state under capitalism and to what Malcolm Waters calls the nation-state's "administrative competence" (achieved especially through surveillance and "industrialized military order" [48]). Highly industrialized, rationalized, and commodified nation-states in the twentieth century facilitated, in Giddens's view, the "'lifting out' of social relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across time and space" (21). Like Immanuel Wallerstein, Giddens sees globalization in fundamentally economic terms, characterized by the dominance of transnational corporations, which turn the world into "a single market for commodities, labour and capital" (Waters 51). For Giddens globalization represents the "intensification of worldwide social relations that link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa" (64). Whereas Robertson's approach suggests that literary and cultural forms produced in various periods may be connected to globalization, Giddens (like Appadurai) suggests a narrower relation between modernity and globalization, one in which literary and cultural studies and globalization primarily intersect in what we usually think of as the modern and postmodern periods. Harvey goes further than Giddens, insisting that globalization marks a fundamental break with modernity. For Giddens globalization is an extension of modernity, but for Harvey it is inextricably linked to postmodernity. Harvey's approach to globalization is keyed to the ways in which mechanization and technology increasingly diminish the constraints space puts on time. With the invention and growing sophistication of shipping, railways, motor, and air transport, the time it takes to move across space has continually shrunk, accelerating the collapse of boundaries and borders and facilitating economic and cultural globalization.

These developments have accelerated with the proliferation of electronic forms of communication, which allows for nearly instantaneous contact and for commercial transactions that cover the globe while virtually ignoring nation-state boundaries. These technologies (particularly the Internet) collapse the discontinuity between time and space in radically new ways. When I argue for a historical view of globalization that sees contemporary globalization as an *acceleration* of forces that have been at work for a few centuries, I am thinking in particular of the speed of change facilitated by the *convergence* of these new technologies. Appadurai gets at this phenomenon in his focus on how technologies related to and facilitating the various "scapes" he enumerates have intersected with one another and ramped up the pace of myriad global flows in our own time, producing what the media critic Henry Jenkins has called "convergence culture" in his book of the same name. If globalization in our own time can be

said to represent a rupture from earlier forms, it is due to the phenomenon of convergence, "a word that," according to Jenkins,

> describes technological, industrial, cultural, and social changes in the ways media circulates within our culture. Some common ideas referenced by the term include the flow of content across multiple media platforms, the cooperation between multiple media industries, the search for new structures of media financing that fall at the interstices between old an new media, and the migratory behavior of media audiences who would go almost anywhere in search of the kind of entertainment experiences they want. Perhaps most broadly, media convergence refers to a situation in which multiple media systems coexist and where media content flows fluidly across them. Convergence is understood here as an ongoing process or series of intersections between different media systems, not a fixed relationship. (282)

Jenkins here articulates the kind of convergence that is at the center of Appadurai's mediascape, but the phenomenon of convergence has a much wider applicability in terms of understanding the accelerating forms of economic globalization in our own time, since the technologies Jenkins enumerates have become central in facilitating the global flow of cash, commodities, and knowledge. Indeed, Jenkins's notion of convergence culture mirrors Joseph Stiglitz's explanation of how economic globalization has dramatically accelerated in our own time as a linked set of institutional practices. Jenkins's exploration of how cultural forms are globally commodified in convergence culture is but one example of the general trend in all forms of economic globalization in an age of convergence.[2] The history of globalization, to a significant degree, is the history of accelerating convergences.

With the differences among Robertson, Giddens, and Harvey in mind, we can see that the question of what globalization is turns out to be inextricably linked to how it is historicized. Robertson's view of globalization is fundamentally different from those put forward by Appadurai, Giddens, and Harvey, and, as I have been suggesting, each one offers us a different context for thinking about how to globalize literary and cultural study. Following Robertson, the globalizing of literary and cultural studies would engage literatures and cultures from nearly every period, while, if—with Appadurai, Giddens, and Harvey—we conceive of globalization as a specifically modern or postmodern phenomenon, we would focus primarily on the literatures of the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. Which of these points of view is correct? While the arguments Appadurai, Giddens, and Harvey make about the acceleration of globalization in the late twentieth century are important, it seems to me that Robertson's approach is the more nuanced one and that it offers wider opportunities for those of us in literary and cultural studies interested in the intersection of globalization and literary

and cultural production. Although it would be a mistake not to acknowledge that a set of explosive forces unleashed in the last half of the twentieth century related to what Jenkins has called "convergence culture" have radically revised transnational exchange, it would be an even bigger mistake not to contextualize these changes in a longer historical view of globalization such as the one Robertson offers. Globalization can certainly help us map the future of literary and cultural studies, but it also provides an important way to rethink our approach to the study of literature across a range of historical periods.

Perhaps more important, the long historical view Robertson takes toward globalization helps dispel the commonplace yet inaccurate idea that globalization is a Western phenomenon fueled by capitalism. Such an argument can only be sustained by viewing globalization narrowly as a late twentieth-century phenomenon. Understood as a longer historical process, however, the phenomenon we call globalization cannot simply be viewed as a product of the West. Critics as disparate as the Nobel Prize–winning economist Amartya Sen and the sociologist Janet Abu-Lughod have quite rightly insisted that globalization long predates the twentieth century and has its roots as much in the East as in the West. Abu-Lughod dates the emergence during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries of what she calls the first "world system" well before European hegemony. Her 1989 book *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350* details the emergence of an economic system linking Europe, the Middle East, and China. Not only was this system *not* dominated by Europe, but many technological and economic advances that developed during this period and which later fueled dramatic expansion in the West came out of China and the Middle East. Sen makes the same point in his 2002 article, "How to Judge Globalism," but pushes the origins of what we now call globalization back to at least 1000, when "the global reach of science, technology, and mathematics was changing the nature of the world" in a trajectory that ran, not from West to East, but from East to West (1). Sen points to a "chain of intellectual relations that link Western mathematics and science to a collection of distinctly non-Western practitioners" (2) and points out that "the printing of the world's first book was a marvelously globalized event," since the technology was Chinese, the book an Indian Sanskrit treatise, and the translation the work of a half-Turk (2). For Sen, "the agents of globalization are neither European nor exclusively Western, nor are they necessarily linked to Western dominance" (2).[3] Such a nuanced and capacious view of globalization can only come from taking a long historical view of its processes. To see globalization as a recent eruption is to mistake not only the date but the nature of its emergence, for it leads us to miss the extent to which earlier world systems outside the West produced forms of knowledge and technology integral to the later phases of globalization. It is important that we not downplay how

globalization has accelerated dramatically in our own time in the ways Appadurai and Jenkins have tried to capture, but in the final analysis this acceleration has to be contextualized within a longer history of technological developments and convergences.[4]

Globalization and Postcolonialism

We cannot consider the historical nature of globalization without thinking of its history in relationship to the histories of colonialism, decolonization, and the era we call "postcolonial." Indeed, the last few years have produced a spirited debate about the historical, theoretical, and strategic relationship between postcolonialism and globalization. Although postcolonialism and globalization studies have clearly worked in concert to transform the substance and geography of both English and comparative literary studies, many critics consistently see their relationship as troubled. Some argue, for example, that postcolonialism as a strategically politicized area of study is threatened by a generalized (and sometimes overly enthusiastic) form of globalization studies, that globalization studies simply represents the newest phase of colonial domination by the West, so that both postcolonial nations themselves and academic fields related to subaltern studies are threatened by the growing hegemony of a thoroughly Westernized brand of economic, cultural, and academic globalization. As we have seen, in Said's view globalization looks like a direct threat to the postcolonial condition and its study. Indeed, it may be that academic forms of globalization simply duplicate the worst effects of economic and cultural globalization. Other critics are more comfortable with trying to accommodate postcolonial studies to the emerging field of globalization studies, which they see offering a new rubric for the transnational study of literature whose historical point of view and dual focus on cultural and economic issues can be an antidote to the narrow textualism and culturalism of the field of postcolonial studies. Viewed together at this particular moment, postcolonialism and globalization seem to offer two somewhat conflicting approaches to the transnational study of literature and culture. How we reconcile the historical relationship between colonialism, postcolonialism, and globalization has a lot to do with the wider question of how we historicize, and thus define, globalization.

It seems to me there are two basic positions one can take on the question of the relationship between postcolonialism and globalization. The first would be to mark a clear historical distinction between the eras of postcolonialism and globalization based on an understanding that, while globalization is a postnational phenomenon, postcolonialism is linked to modernity and the long epoch of the nation-state. The second, however, would insist on a fundamental connection between postcolonialism and globalization, one based on an understanding that both colonialism and postcolonialism are integral to the very history of globalization. The first view separates postcolonialism and globalization historically, connecting postcolonialism to the rise of modernity and the epoch of nationalism, while seeing globalization as fundamentally postnational and postmodern. The second view recognizes that postcolonialism marks a break in the history of colonialism and the exercise of colonial power, while insisting that postcolonialism belongs nevertheless to the late history of the nation-state. From this point of view, postcolonialism marks a break in the history of the nation-state but not a break *from* that history. The second point of view rejects the idea that globalization is a contemporary, or postmodern, phenomenon. It insists that globalization actually has a long history and that the whole arch of European imperial expansion, colonization, decolonization, and the establishment of postcolonial states figures prominently in that history. Instead of drawing a clear line between the modern age of the nation-state and the postmodern emergence of a transnational, global economic and cultural system, this point of view sees globalization as a long historical process unfolding in ever-accelerating phases. To be sure, in the earlier phases of globalization, the nation-state linked colonization and economic exploitation in the interests of its own expansion, while in its more recent phase multinational corporations and the mass media have begun to challenge the power of the nation-state (though questions of domination and exploitation persist). But such observations from this point of view do not undermine the basic argument that colonialism, postcolonialism, and globalization are historically linked in important ways. They simply suggest how the long history of globalization might be written.

The first point of view sees postcolonialism and globalization as largely at odds with each other, and so it does not provide a very productive context for thinking about how the two approaches to transnational literary and cultural studies they inform can be reconciled. From this point of view, the postcolonial state is relegated to the fading epoch of modernity, while the structures and cultures of globalization are associated with postmodern convergence culture and with a future in which the nation-state plays an increasingly peripheral role. Moreover, the violent history of colonialism threatens to get lost in the rush to understand the impact of contemporary economic and cultural globalization in postcolonial states and elsewhere. The second view is more helpful than the first, recognizing as it does that the histories of colonization, decolonization, and postcolonialism are part of the long history of globalization. This view can productively connect the two by questioning the whole idea of a historical break separating postcolonialism from globalization. Indeed, it suggests that there will

be some level of continuity between the issues taken up by both postcolonial and global literatures.

Critics who have written about the tensions between postcolonialism and globalization have taken a number of different strategies in sorting out their relationship. Writing in a 2000 article on postcolonialism and globalization, Simon During draws what he calls a "schematic distinction" between the two. In his view postcolonialism is "an intellectual effort at managing the aftermath of the colonial past in an era when official political relations of colonialism had all but ended." It is largely concerned with "rescuing the 'non-modern' and subaltern agency from Western presentist universalism without turning towards transhistorical, participatory myths of origin and continuity." "Globalization theory," in contrast, "has been mainly addressed to the effects of geosynchronous communication technologies and massified transcontinental mobility to the formation of collectivities... bound together by neither history nor geography" and to the "triumph of the 'world economy' over local and national ones" (388–89). On the face of it, During seems to reject the idea that the histories of postcolonialism and globalization intersect or overlap. However, his position is more complicated than that, for rather than treating postcolonialism monolithically he distinguishes between two kinds of postcolonialism, "reconciliatory" and "critical" (385):

> Reconciliatory postcolonialism figures colonialism as a kind of tragedy with a happy ending—tragic because it was partly based on destruction and ethnocide; happy in the sense that the world-historical outcome—which we now name globalization—unifies and de-spatializes the world in ways which supposedly render colonial repression obsolete. From this postcolonialist perspective, colonialism in effect becomes an episode in the longer sweep of globalization, and all events that once fell under the rubric colonialism are ripe to fall under the rubric globalization. (392)

This is a helpful distinction up to a point, but it is ultimately too reductive and simplifying. It tacks a rather spurious conclusion (colonial repression has happily become "obsolete") onto the otherwise quite logical assertion that colonialism can be understood in the context of "the longer sweep of globalization." Does any serious critic really see this as constituting a "happy ending" for colonialism, one in which "colonial repression" becomes "obsolete?" I don't think so.[5] Beyond this, there is a problem with the episodic structure of this formulation. Colonialism, postcolonialism, and globalization are not successive episodes. They have to a significant degree unfolded simultaneously. So, During's "reconciliatory postcolonialism" is a bit of a straw man. It represents a position very few people

actually take and is based on the assumption you cannot construe colonialism, postcoloniality, and globalization in relation to one another without taking a politically retrograde position toward the historical and contemporary violence committed by colonialism. This is just plain wrong.

To some degree During has intentionally set up "reconciliatory postcolonialism" as a kind of foil for "critical postcolonialism," which he somewhat ambiguously defines as a practice that "names the seizing of an opportunity to recover or construct differences and marginalized pasts by activists and intellectuals against the West, as the West was being emptied out into, or diffused through, the global system" (392). Critical postcolonialism recognizes the relationship between colonialism and the development of a global system and understands "reconciliatory postcolonialism" as complicit with a Western-dominated modernity bent on normalizing the Other through economic and cultural assimilation. (Again, if "reconciliatory postcolonialism" is defined by a view that the history of colonialism is part of the history of globalization, it is not clear why it also has to be "complicit" with modernity's domination of the Other.) Since critical postcolonialism is by definition looking for new paradigms and a new language with which to critique traditional approaches to the study of colonization and the postcolonial condition, it is, according to During, much more open to a dialogue with globalization studies. Indeed, he goes so far as to suggest that globalization has begun to supersede postcolonialism as a critical rubric for the historical study of colonization and decolonization (387). In his view, if one affirms a "dialectical relation between postcolonialism and globalism it becomes more difficult either to claim intellectual radicalness and subversion while preparing the way for a happy globalism, as reconciliatory postcolonialists do, or to make claims for the strict autonomy and continuity of identities rooted in pre-colonial pasts as some indigenous groups do" (393). Critical postcolonialism, then, rejects the idea there is an episodic relationship between postcolonialism and globalization, and reconceives the relationship in dialectical terms. During is generally upbeat about the role a critical discourse about globalization can play in the study of postcoloniality; but he warns globalization must not be seen as "the end of ethnic and colonialist struggles" but as a "force through which these struggles are continually re-articulated and re-placed, and through which the transitivity of relations like colonizer/colonized, centre/local is continually proved" (402). In this sense, globalization emerges as something like a discourse for redescribing the entire history of colonization, decolonization, and postcoloniality. But During has a final caveat: "If the colonial era is going to be remembered in the era of globalization as always already global, that analytic and commemoratory move does not have to be set against the local and indigenous politics of self-determination upon which critical postcolonialisms finally rest" (402).

During's concerns here are reminiscent of Miyoshi's complaint about the turn toward difference and the local in contemporary criticism and his advocacy of a totalizing critical system. Where Miyoshi rejects outright the idea that globalization studies offers an appropriate totalizing system, During suggests that it does, but his concerns are diametrically opposed to Miyoshi's. Where Miyoshi worries that a focus on the local, the indigenous, and on difference undermines our ability to articulate the kind of totalizing system he advocates, During worries that any totalizing system runs the risk of setting the needs of a global picture "against the local and indigenous." Their different positions underscore a basic dilemma for any transnational critical practice: how to balance a global or macro view that tries to take the kind of totalizing approach Miyoshi advocates with one that focuses, as During insists it must, on local histories, economies, subjectivities, and cultural practices.

Where During and Miyoshi worry about the balance of emphasis in the transnational study of literature and culture between the global and the local, other critics, such as Simon Gikandi, Revathi Krishnaswamy, and Harry Harootunian, are concerned about the extent to which postcolonial theory has fostered an excessive interest in culture at the expense of material and economic conditions among contemporary globalization critics. In his discussion of the somewhat vexed relationship between postcolonial and area studies, Harootunian notes in the 2002 essay "Postcolonality's Unconscious/Area Studies' Desire," that while "postcolonial studies resembles the older practices of area studies programs with their intellectual and scholarly divisions of labor into regional subsets like East Asia, Middle East, South Asia, [and] Africa" (150), it is predicated on a critique of the very neocolonialism that area studies helped prop up.[6] However, he laments that "postcolonial studies has strangely converged with area studies in recuperating the privilege of culture and cultural values" (169) rather than paying attention to economic and material conditions, to "the role played by capitalism throughout the globe and to the relationship between the experience of everydayness and the relentless regime of the commodity form" (173). Because the implications of Said's *Orientalism* got taken up by literary studies rather than by areas studies, postcolonial criticism, in Harootunian's view, was forced "to appeal to culturalism" (154) and the "textuality" of the "literary/semiotic disciplines" (155). For this reason, one effect of the monopolization of colonial discourse by English studies and its gradual transformation into postcolonial theory is that the migration of colonial discourse to English studies meant that its emphasis would be textual, semiotic, and generic, whereas if area studies had confronted the challenge posed by the Saidian critique, there would have been greater concern for the social sciences and the role played by political economy, that is to say, materiality (167).

In making this argument, Harootunian exaggerates the extent to which postcolonial criticism has come to dominate literary studies in general and English in particular. In the interests of indicting postcolonialism for its complicity with literary studies (as over against "functionalist social science" [155]), Harootunian seems to forget that Said was a literature professor who wrote important books on Joseph Conrad and the English novel. It is, therefore, no surprise that postcolonialism found literature departments hospitable. But surely it is an exaggeration to claim, as Harootunian does, that "English studies became postcoloniality" (168). For this reason, Harootunian reduces postcolonial studies to a form of textualized culturalism and then laments its inattention to material and economic conditions. Harootunian would have area studies supplanted by a new form of postcolonial studies that eschews textualism and culture and instead incorporates social science methodology in the analysis of political economy and materiality.

Harootunian's argument, it seems to me, is based on a false distinction between economies and cultures. His emphasis on material conditions makes sense until it is used as a club to beat "culturalism" over the head. For no contemporary approach to economic flows of power under the forces of globalization can do without a clear historical understanding of how cultures and commodities are embedded within each other. (Appadurai does an effective job making this link, as we have already seen.) It seems to me that any transnational or global approach to literary and cultural studies has to find a way to link cultural and textual analysis to an analysis of material conditions and economic forces. Surely, it is clear by now that culture and textuality are embedded in economic and social relations, and that material economies are inextricably connected both to cultural forms and to structures of discourse and representation that are open to textual analyses. My argument here is that *both* culturalist and materialist positions, when they are articulated too narrowly, are mistaken. Culture *is* a set of material practices linked to economies, and economic and material relations are always mediated by cultural factors and forms. We need to avoid taking methodological or theoretical positions that imply that they are separate. (Indeed, in part 2, we see by analyzing selected novels that contemporary literature dealing with globalization often takes this more nuanced position.)

Like Harootunian, Gikandi in *Maps of Englishness: Writing Identity in the Culture of Colonialism* sees the contribution postcolonial studies makes to our thinking about globalization in primarily cultural terms. He points out that "when social scientists try to differentiate older forms of globalization ... from the new forms" they often "fall back on key words borrowed from postcolonial theory" such as "hybridity and difference" (631). This borrowing, in his view, is linked to a general claim among such critics that "culture, as a social and conceptual

category," is at the center of contemporary globalization because it is culture, more than anything else, that has "escaped 'the bounded nation-state society' and has thus become the common property of the world" (631).[7] Appadurai and Homi Bhabha serve as Gikandi's main examples of this trend, which includes a tendency to make "rather optimistic claims that the institutions of cultural production" under contemporary globalization "provide irrefutable evidence of new global relations" (631–32), relations that are used to authorize a liberatory conception of the effects of global cultural hybridity. According to Gikandi, critics like Appadurai (and Bhabha) tend to see "global images" as a "substitute for material experiences" and privilege "literary texts—and the institutions that teach them—as the exemplars of globalization" (632). In Gikandi's scenario, "older forms of globalization based on the centrality of the nation and theories of modernization" (636) have been displaced by a "postcolonial perspective on globalization" (636) that sees it as characterized by a "new mode of global cultural, and social relations" defined "by its transgression of the boundaries established by the nation-state, the structures of dominant economic and social formations," and by a "Eurocentric sense of time" tied to theories of modernity (635). Earlier conceptions of globalization in sociology and political science tended to see globalization as an extension of modernity dominated by nation-states and as fundamentally economic in nature, while the new conceptions of globalization developing in postcolonial studies tend to see globalization as a fundamentally cultural phenomena that transcends nation-states and is distinguishable from economic globalization. The dangers of an exclusively culturalist approach are that a narrow focus on access to popular cultural forms in convergence culture that are too glibly seen to be liberatory can obscure the extent to which the material reality of economic globalization remains asymmetrical and unfair.

Gikandi ties this newer culturalist approach to what at the beginning of his essay he identifies as a positive, upbeat narrative about globalization (629) embraced by critics like Bhabha and Jan Nederveen Pieterse. In this narrative, contemporary globalization ushers in something like a "cultural world order" markedly different from the one defined by modernity (629). In this new order the power of the nation-state to regulate culture and its constitutive role in constructing subjectivity and agency is replaced by one in which both are constructed across old borders and boundaries in strikingly appropriative and imaginative ways by individuals and groups. In this scenario, globalization looks less like a dominating homogenization or westernization and a lot more like a chaotic but ultimately liberating context for constructing new subjectivities that are essentially "hybrid," relatively free of the constraints of nationalism and the power it wields over its subjects. Gikandi contrasts this positive narrative about globalization to one that views globalization as a crisis. This narrative of crisis,

again a fairly familiar one in debates about globalization, focuses less on culture than on the uneven or detrimental effects of economic globalization, insisting that there is a stark reality of material conditions that is not reflected in the global cultural imaginary conjured up by critics like Appadurai and Bhabha. In this view, global images (especially in literature) are no "substitute for material experiences" (632), and the material experience of globalization by populations outside metropolitan centers (and a good many within them) do not correspond to the liberatory narrative of the culturalist critics Gikandi discusses.[8] He insists that those who celebrate the liberatory effects of globalization in effect have to "forget the nation," where those effects are hard to find, and focus on an amorphous, metropolitan, and highly westernized sphere of the "global," where it is mainly elite migrants who enjoy the supposed benefits of hybridity and difference (639).[9] From this point of view it is important to "recognize that although almost all theories of globalization are premised on the assumed marginalization of the nation-state in the domain of culture and the imaginary, there is scant evidence that the same processes are at work in the politics of everyday life, where the rhetoric of globalization is constantly undermined by the resurgence of older forms of nationalism, patriotism, and fundamentalism" (640).[10]

The possibility that the critical discourses of postcolonialism and globalization can somehow be integrated is dogged by a pressing problem linked to Gikandi's insistence that a narrative of "crisis" dominates contemporary forms of globalization, for he is certainly right that the forces of economic and cultural globalization have been, at the very least, a double-edged sword for postcolonial nations and the cultures they seek to sustain. (We need only recall the stress Stiglitz puts on the West's clumsy attempts to control and manage globalization toward its own ends.) Although in the first phase of globalization the nation-state harnesses colonization with capital development in the interests of its own expansion, in globalization's later phases multinational corporations and the mass media begin to outpace the colonizing state's power, but too often with the same asymmetrical economic results. The late postcolonial phase of this first stage suggests a historical epoch in which the formerly colonized achieve a measure of power and autonomy through the creation of postcolonial nation-states. However, the forces of globalization represent something of an ironic moment for such states. One irony, as Ania Loomba points out in her discussion of Benedict Anderson's work in *Colonialism/Postcolonialism,* is that the nation-state itself is based on a European, colonial model, so that "anti-colonial nationalism," as represented by the emergence of the postcolonial nation-state, "is itself made possible and shaped by European political and intellectual history" (189). The structure that colonizes becomes, ironically, the vehicle of liberation. A second irony, as Loomba points out, is that at the very moment of the postcolonial state's

constitution, the power and autonomy of the nation-state itself get called into question by transnational forces that threaten its demise. Worse yet, economic globalization demands participation in a transnational economic system that threatens the economy, sovereignty, and cultural identity of all nation-states, especially newly emergent ones. The paradox here is painfully clear. Economic development is tied to investment in a global economy, but that economy also brings with it a potentially homogenizing, westernizing set of cultural forces that threaten both the economic and cultural autonomy of the nation-state. The combined economic and cultural force of globalization seems poised to take control of the very economy it might liberate. And, too often, "liberation" is cast by academic critics as a function of cultural consumption.

This quandary underscores the central challenge in constructing a working relationship between postcolonialism and globalization. On the one hand, it is not that difficult to see how the histories of colonization, decolonization, and postcolonialism are integral to the history of globalization, and that for this reason the two processes or epochs ought to be studied in interconnected ways. But how can globalization studies contribute to the project of postcolonial studies when globalization itself is now a central threat to the postcolonial nation-state? And, after all, isn't postcolonialism grounded in resistance to, and autonomy from, the kind of colonization the forces of globalization represent? (Such resistance is central to During's "critical postcolonialism.") Doesn't globalization, as a historical, political, economic, and cultural force, threaten the distinct political structures and cultural identities of postcolonial nation-states that are deeply committed to the process of recovering and enriching forms of cultural expression nearly obliterated by colonization? Don't we have to take seriously the argument that globalization is a fundamentally homogenizing force, one that inexorably spreads Western foods, fashions, music, patterns of consumption, and values wherever capital expansion and the media go, laying waste to local forms of identity and cultural expression? Finally, don't academic globalization studies represent the return of the repressed, the colonizing machinery of critical paradigms (whether culturalist or materialist) that in their most benign forms assimilate Otherness to Western disciplinary forms, and in their more insidious ones, as Loomba has put it, celebrate globalization "as the producer of a new and 'liberating' hybridity or multiculturalism, terms that now circulate to ratify the mish-mash of cultures generated by the near unipolar domination of the western, particularly United States, media machine?" (256).

These are hard questions to answer, especially for academics in the West who are deeply interested in postcolonial literatures and cultures yet also fascinated by the processes of globalization and the hybrid cultural forms it is creating. We can begin to deal with them, however, by acknowledging that there ought to be two sides to Loomba's warning. We do need to guard against making a fetish of hybridity and multiculturalism when it simply represents a "mish-mash" of homogenized cultural forms shaped and dominated by mass media outlets in the West. We also need to be wary of celebrating the liberating effects of this "mish-mash" when it may be obliterating deeply felt and long-standing forms of cultural and economic behavior. We need to take care not to obscure the asymmetrical nature of economic and cultural change under the regimes of colonialism *and* contemporary globalization. The kind of hybridity Loomba references is too often produced in a fundamentally oppressive context, even if the exchanges are reciprocal. As Stiglitz points out, although the developing world generally has more agency under globalization than it did under colonialism, agency is still too often restricted, and syncretism can be imposed through hierarchical structures dominated by the West.

With respect to cultural autonomy, no matter where we come from or what our cultural roots, we also need to guard against insisting that whole regions of the world, and their sometimes impoverished populations, must preserve their traditional economic and cultural characters and resist accommodation with a global economy and the cultural changes it brings simply because we in the West enjoy their traditional economic practices or what their ways of dressing, eating, or making music represent (as if these cultures exist for the West as a kind of anthropological museum or living diorama). It is nearly impossible to question this impulse without seeming to side with Western capitalist forces of exploitation and sameness, but I think we need to find a way to try. There has to be a more complicated, nuanced, and carefully thought-through position on the relationship between postcolonialism and globalization than the polar ones suggested by Loomba and other critics, that is, one that sees all forms of cultural hybridity or cultural experimentation and transformation as the evil result of globalization, and the position that unthinkingly celebrates hybridity and multiculturalism as paths to liberation from the paralyzing effects of cultural fundamentalisms wherever they may be. The first position makes a fetish of purity and stasis, ignoring the fact that cultures all over the world have always evolved syncretically in the context of complicated interactions, and it plays down the extent to which people subject to contemporary Western cultural forms translate and appropriate them in complex ways (a position that ought not to play down the history of cultural and political violence perpetuated in the name of colonization). The second position runs the risk of making a fetish of cultural syncretism and hybridity for its own sake, as if culture only liberates when it renounces tradition and embraces syncretism and change, as if cultural forms of liberation somehow compensate for continued economic exploitation. This position can represent too enthusiastic an embrace of globalization without a recognition of the price it exacts.

It seems to me that transnational literary and cultural studies, whether they present themselves as postcolonial or global, have to begin with a recognition that cultures have always traveled and changed, that the effects of globalization, dramatic as they are, only represent in an accelerated form something that has always taken place: the inexorable change that occurs through intercultural contact, as uneven as the forms it takes may be. Here we need to return to the helpfully complicated analyses of Abu-Lughod and Sen, who reject the idea that globalization is simply a Western imperializing or colonizing phenomenon, arguing that it represents a set of developmental processes that cannot be reduced in any politically vulgar way to "westernization," that problems related to globalization require not that it be rejected outright but that we develop just and ethical processes for its regulation (the position Stiglitz endorses). It ought to be possible to take such a totalizing view of social and cultural change without ignoring obvious differences in how such changes occur, without, that is, collapsing benign forms of change into those resulting from violence and domination (a position During rightly or not ascribes to reconciliatory postcolonialism) or mistaking imaginative cultural appropriations for the achievement of economic autonomy and power. To say that all cultures are always hybrid, or to draw a link between cultural change under economic globalization to cultural change under colonialism, should not mean ignoring the differences between relatively benign and openly violent forms of change, and it should not inhibit the development of a historical and contemporary critique of the negative effects of such forms of change. And, most certainly, it does not necessitate our seeing colonialism as having come to some happy resolution in the age of globalization, as During asserts. Sometimes cultural change comes in the context of trade and commodity exchange, which often creates deeply institutionalized forms of economic oppression, but which can also facilitate fascinating forms of cultural improvisation in terms of social behavior or the production of anything from food to fashion, music, and literature.[11] But such change, as Abu-Lughod, Sen, and Appiah emphasize, has always happened, and it is hard to find a place on the globe where what we might want to celebrate as local or indigenous culture is either local or indigenous.

This is certainly the case with respect to the geographical areas central to my own work on transnational literatures in English: the Caribbean, South Asia, and the border zone of the United States and Mexico. One would be hard put to identify cultural forms that are "indigenous" to any of these regions. Culture and identity in these areas are the complex result of the long history of what we now call globalization. There are, lamentably, no "indigenous" Caribbeans in anything like the strict sense of the word. The literatures of the Caribbean are therefore deeply engaged with the complex interaction of indigenous, African, Asian, and colonial populations and cultures, all of which have contributed to the creation of a radically syncretic set of Caribbean populations.[12] The Indian subcontinent, where so much new literature in English has its roots, has been swept by Greek, Persian, and Islamic invasions that forged a deeply hybrid cultural mix in what became modern India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, well before the establishment of the East India Company and, later, the British Raj. And the border regions of the American Southwest are characterized by a dizzying mix of Native American, Hispanic, and African American populations and cultures (from Florida and New Orleans all the way to Southern California) that make the whole notion of the indigenous almost obsolete.

In the final analysis, any integration of postcolonial and globalization studies in the interests of transnationalizing literary studies must be based on a critical postcolonialism like the one During articulates, and it must be committed to his view that the relationship between postcolonialism and globalization is dialectical. To the extent such a project attempts to "reconcile" the two forces, it need not, as During suggests it is fated to do, turn attention away from analyzing the violent and oppressive nature of colonization (including the ways in which those forces extend well into the era of postcolonization). Understanding that globalization is not just a contemporary phenomenon, but that it has a long history that incorporates the epochs of colonization, decolonization, and postcolonialism, can help us deal with the complexity of literary and cultural production without taking either of the polar positions. Globalization can provide a comprehensive historical framework through which we can analyze more carefully forms of political colonization and cultural syncretism created by the long history of cross-cultural contact and how these forms have directed the struggle of both "indigenous" and diasporic populations to develop forms of political and economic autonomy.

For literary studies, this framework suggests a context in which the literatures of postcolonialism and globalization ought to be studied in relationship to each other. Indeed, if we accept the idea I have been advocating here that globalization has a long history in the East as well as the West, encompassing the various epochs of colonization, decolonization, and postcolonialism in all their historical complexity, it becomes difficult to draw clear distinctions between postcolonial literature and literature engaged more specifically with the contemporary effects of globalization. We ought to recognize that globalization in the eras of conquest and colonization was tied to the long epoch of modernity and the rise to dominance of the nation-state, and that globalization in a postcolonial and postmodern era complicates the power of nation-states and facilitates the creation of radically unpredictable and transnational cultural forms and hybrid subjectivities. As I have stressed, it is important that we draw distinctions between

the forms of economic and cultural exchange produced (and to some degree, enforced) by colonialism and its demise and those produced since then—through the convergence of new technologies of communication and travel; the circulation of commodities, people, knowledge, and cash characterized by Appadurai's "financescape"; and the advent of globalization as an institutional practice as charted by Stiglitz. However, we also need to recognize that the continuities between these historical eras are at least as important as their differences. If they are worth distinguishing, it is in order to underscore the dialectical relationship they have with one another.

3

Economies, Cultures, and the Politics of Globalization

While the economic and cultural dimensions of globalization are inextricably linked across the various phases of its development, we cannot understand the acceleration of globalization without recognizing its development first as an economic phenomenon, especially in the twentieth century, when trade and capital exchange across national borders dramatically expanded in response to the increasing modernization of technologies of transport and communication. Here it will be instructive to return to Stiglitz's definition of globalization: "What is this phenomenon of globalization that has been subject, at the same time, to such vilification and such praise? Fundamentally, it is the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world which has been brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders" (9). For Stiglitz, globalization is fundamentally related to economic flows, but more important, it is about the *convergence* of expanding markets and communication technologies, and the rapid transport of goods, capital, knowledge, and services. We earlier saw Appadurai emphasize this phenomenon of convergence in his articulation of the various "landscapes" that characterize globalization: ethnoscapes, mediascapes,

narratives of national belonging run the risk of creating absolutist categories of difference based on narrow notions of ethnic belonging. Virtually all of the novels I discussed in this book seek to find a way to work past such reductive categories. They do not provide simple answers to complex questions about identity, culture, and belonging, but rather they productively trouble the way we think about those questions. In so doing, they present a model for the critical work we do, for the very act of reading and understanding them.

Notes

Introduction

1. See Appiah (2006), chap. 7.

2. Such a project is closer to the one taken up by David Damrosch, who looks at how modes of reading, translation, and circulation produce "world literature" written in and translated into many different languages.

3. These developments coincide with critiques of what Gerald Graff has called the field-coverage model in literary studies (see his *Professing Literature: An Institutional History*). While Graff's book, published in 1987, does not deal with the effects of globalization on the curriculum, his cogent criticisms of the historical-period paradigm in literary studies helped pave the way for rethinking the curriculum in literary studies in an age in which the effects of globalization on the production of literature have become much clearer. Bill Readings extends Graff's discussion in a way that connects it to late twentieth-century globalization.

4. For a discussion of some of the challenges of treating English globally, see Michael Bérubé's 2002 introduction to the special edition of *Modern Fiction Studies* on postmodernism and the globalization of English.

5. I borrow the concept of a "default narrative" for historical explanations from the historian Thomas Bender (see his *A Nation among Nations: America's Place in World History* and "No Borders: Beyond the Nation-State").

Chapter 1. Difference, Multiculturalism, and the Globalizing of Literary Studies

1. This observation is a recurrent one. See, for example, Susan Friedman (2007), who asks, "Why now—the naming of migrations, diasporas, and borders as a field? In a word, *globalization*, a term with

shifting meanings that spawn debate about its politics, its utopian possibilities and its dystopic realities" (261). "The rapid emergence of transnationalism and globalization as pervasive categories in literary studies," she continues, "helps explain the new significance of migration, diaspora, and borders as a cross-departmental and cross-specialty field of inquiry in the study of modern languages" (263).

2. For an earlier indication of the growing impact of globalization on the study of literature, see the January 2000 special issue of *PMLA* entitled "Globalizing Literary Studies."

3. Each of these chapters documents specific ways in which the field under consideration has developed a transnational emphasis over the last two decades.

4. See, in particular, Eagleton (1983) and Graff (1987).

5. See Culler's *Literary Theory: A Very Short Introduction,* 6–8.

6. For a discussion of its impact, see Daniels (2008).

7. See P. Jay (1998), G. Jay (1991), Porter (1994), and Saldívar (1991).

8. Near the beginning of the published version of her remarks, "Crossroads of Culture," Fishkin writes: "In many of its earliest incarnations American studies aspired to overarching generalities about the United States. The field had little room for the dissenting voices of minorities and women, and a fixation on American innocence blinded many scholars to the country's ambitious quest for empire" (20). Today, however, "another generative question in the spirit of those others is becoming increasingly salient: What would the field of American studies look like if the transnational rather than the national were at its center—as it is already for many scholars in this room?" (5). The rest of her essay is an exhaustive survey of such work.

9. The distinction between roots and routes was popularized by Paul Gilroy in his book, *The Black Atlantic* (1993), but it was first used in the late 1990s by the cultural anthropologist James Clifford.

10. On the transnational turn in American studies, see Fishkin's address to the American Studies Association published as "Crossroads of Culture" (2005). On the similar shift in modern studies, see Mao and Walkowitz in *PMLA* (2008).

11. A few important examples from the disparate fields of sociology, anthropology, cultural studies, American studies, and literary studies would include Roland Robertson's *Globalization* (1992); *Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change,* edited by Jon Bird et al. (1993); Frederick Buell's *National Culture and the New Global System* (1994); Malcolm Waters's *Globalization* (1995); Bill Readings's *The University in Ruins* (1996); *Culture, Globalization, and the World-System: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity,* edited by Anthony King (1997); *Articulating the Global and the Local: Globalization and Cultural Studies,* edited by Ann Cvetkovich and Douglas Kellner (1987); Arjun Appadurai's *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (1998); Bruce Robbins's *Feeling Global* (1999); *The Cultures of Globalization,* edited by Frederic Jameson and Masao Miyoshi (1998); *PMLA*'s January 2000 special issue, "Globalizing Literary Studies"; Tyler Cowen's, *Creative Destruction: How Globalization is Changing the World's Cultures* (2004); and *Globalization and the Humanities,* edited by David Li (2004).

12. For critical discussions of the role of nationalism in American literary studies see Buell (1994), Carafiol (1991), G. Jay (1991), P. Jay (1998), and Porter (1994).

13. While this is still technically true, authors of important books have begun to argue we are moving into an age in which global domination by the United States is on the wane, an effect both of the success of globalization and the failures of U.S. foreign policy under the George W. Bush administration. See, in particular, Parag Khanna's *The Second World* and Fareed Zakaria's *The Post-American World,* both published in 2008.

14. For an extended discussion of this concern, see Sabine Milz's "Global Literary Study, Postcolonial Study, and Their (Missing) Interrelations: A Materialist Critique," in which she reviews a number of complaints about the essays contained in *PMLA*'s special issue on globalizing literary studies.

15. It is interesting to compare Miyoshi's rejection of the term *globalization* to Appiah's. While Appiah rejects it because he finds it banal and overused, Miyoshi bases his rejection of it on a substantive critique of the economic effects of globalization.

16. See "Ivory Tower in Escrow" (2002), 39–50.

17. Although their critical and political positions regarding globalization and its effects could hardly be more different, Miyoshi's concern with the stress on difference and relativism and the need for a totalizing perspective to counteract it is not all that far removed from Appiah's insistence that cosmopolitanism could go a long way toward creating an ethical framework with a totalizing perspective.

18. Such a pattern is quite clear in Gerald Graff's *Professing Literature: An Institutional History.*

19. I say "however awkwardly" because, as I have indicated, we do need to acknowledge that there are significant problems with both these discourses. I return to this topic in the chapters that follow.

20. Miyoshi's insistence that we ought to avoid critical discourses connected to multiculturalism and globalization because they have been co-opted, or are even directed by, the forces of global capitalism exhibits what I am tempted to call an anxiety about complicity that I think ends up being debilitating. I argued in 1992 in an essay on deconstruction and politics that Derrida was overly concerned with policing the political uses of deconstruction to avoid its being used by the wrong politics to the extent that he contributed to the misleading idea that deconstruction was not political (P. Jay 1992). Miyoshi, I believe, shares this kind of anxiety about complicity, a desire to keep one's theoretical and methodological positions free from the appearance of complicity with a bad politics. It seems to me this kind of anxiety about complicity is at times more debilitating than it is productive, based at it often is on a false idea that our work can be underwritten by some kind of pure or untroubled politics. I thank Nasrin Qader for a lively conversation in which this idea got worked out.

Chapter 2. What Is Globalization?

1. The acceleration of economic globalization in the late twentieth century (discussed at greater length in chapter 3) has been elegantly traced by Joseph Stiglitz. For Stiglitz, globalization in its contemporary form is reflected in attempts to manage institutionally a series of transnational crises including the Great Depression, the need to rebuild a devastated Europe at the end of World War II, the demise of colonialism in the 1950s and 1960s, and the collapse of Communism in the late 1980s. The need to manage these successive crises was accompanied by an "enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders" (9), developments that accelerated the pace of long-standing economic and cultural exchanges across borders.

2. See, in particular, Jenkins's discussion of "corporate convergence" in his introduction and chapter 3, especially 109–12; and his discussion of the relationship between economics, politics, and media convergence, in chapter 6.

3. Sen deploys this historical analysis in the interests of his larger argument against two positions about globalization, one that sees globalization in wholly beneficial terms and as a "gift from the West to the world," and another that sees globalization as a form of "Western dominance" and a "continuation of Western imperialism" (1). Having demonstrated that globalization has a long history in the East and is not a product of Western capitalism or imperialism (although it becomes linked to these two processes), Sen goes on to argue the problem is not globalization itself but the need for an ethical and just regulation of its forces. "The central issue of contention is not globalization itself," he concludes, "nor is it the use of the market as an institution, but the inequity in the overall balance of institutional arrangements which produces very unequal sharing of the benefits of globalization" (8).

4. It is worth noting that opportunities for agency (economic, cultural, and personal) vary greatly at different periods in the history of globalization. The kind of agency Appadurai and Jenkins associate with convergence culture was not, of course, available at periods when globalization was being driven by the slave trade and colonization. Domination and exploitation associated with colonialism and the slave trade produced forms of hybridity, but in a much more asymmetrical and oppressive way than in our own time.

5. Arif Dirlik's position in "Rethinking Colonialism: Globalization, Postcolonialism, and the Nation" seems to come close to the "reconciliatory postcolonialism" that During describes here, but the political position he takes on colonialism hardly accords with the one During ascribes to a reconciliatory position. Dirlik argues that in spite of the violence and devastation it has caused, colonialism has utterly transformed the identities of colonized people everywhere. Everything from claims about the configuration of precolonial identity to the idea that all identities are hybrid can be traced back, in Dirlik's view, to colonialism. All identity, that is, is a product of colonialism, and its hybridization is an ongoing historical process. Dirlik's interest in globalization reflects his desire to move postcolonial studies away from a fixation on colonialism and identity and refocus its attention on the workings of global capitalism. This position does seem to attempt to reconcile the histories of colonialism, postcolonialism, and globalization, but

it doesn't embrace the reactionary political position During links to reconciliatory postcolonialism. Indeed, one could argue it mixes a reconciliatory and critical approach to postcolonialism in a way that belies During's distinction.

6. Harootunian insists that because of "the relentless kinship area studies formed with strategic policy making [during the cold war] serving national interests and 'contract research,' it was never able to free itself from the pursuit of a knowledge bonded to the necessities that had given it shape" (157).

7. Gikandi is quoting from Mike Featherstone's introduction to *Global Culture,* 2.

8. Gikandi's position is echoed by both Revathi Krishnaswamy (2002) and Supriya Nair (2001). Krishnaswamy questions Appadurai's "celebratory view of consumption as active and agential" (116), which he sees pushing "globalization theory toward an optimistic position that merges into a postmodern celebration of difference and differentiation" (115). Likewise, Nair questions the priority given to the "cultural" among critics like Appadurai and Gilroy, who link "migrancy and transcendence of national boundaries" with forms of resistance that are not available to those who, she points out, remain in the home country (267).

9. See, in this regard, Gikandi's discussion of Gayatri Spivak's distinction between "migrant" and "national" postcolonial subjects (Gikandi, 639–40). Gikandi makes the point that "postcolonial theories of globalization have been influential in the mapping of global culture because they have appeared to be focused on tropes that speak powerfully to the experience of migration. The downside to this focus on migrancy and its images, however, is that the national has tended to be negated" (640).

10. For another argument that postcolonial studies ought to stay focused on the nation, even as it pursues its interest in transnational and diasporic spaces, see Nair.

11. On the complexity of this phenomenon, see Appadurai's discussion of the "work of the imagination" (5–11).

12. For an extended discussion of this kind of syncretism in the Caribbean, see Antonio Benítez-Rojo's *The Repeating Island* and Paul Gilroy's *The Black Atlantic.*

Chapter 3. Economies, Cultures, and the Politics of Globalization

1. Stiglitz is unsparing in his criticism of how regulatory institutions have mismanaged globalization. These institutions, dominated by policymakers and bureaucrats from Western nations, "have pushed poor countries to eliminate trade barriers, but kept their own barriers" in place (6). The "free market mantra" of the 1980s, widely referred to as "the Washington Consensus," led to the imposition of policies for economic stabilization and growth in developing countries that trampled on their national sovereignty (19) and turned out to be "ill suited" to their needs (16). While globalization has improved economic conditions in some areas, "for millions of people globalization has not worked," indeed, many "have been made worse off" (248). According to statistics Stiglitz cites, during the last decade of the twentieth century "the actual number of people living in poverty has actually increased by almost 100 million" (5).

2. All of these problems are reflected in a country like India, where, for example, a Western-imposed "green revolution" forced poor farmers to abandon the use of local seeds for hybrid ones, which required the use of expensive and destructive pesticides, a practice that proved to be an unmitigated disaster. Crop production was uneven, and pesticides were so expensive that many farmers went broke, with some committing suicide by drinking the pesticides. See Vandana Shiva for a thorough study of the failure of the green revolution in India. Globalization in India has also produced a deepening divide between a vast impoverished class and those who have benefited economically from globalization that Stiglitz finds characteristic of globalization's processes. It has produced rapid and disruptive urbanization that has fueled poverty and overwhelmed the infrastructure in Indian cities. In addition, the cultural and social values of both traditional rural societies and urban ones have been radically disrupted, making India a case study of the uneven effects of globalization.

3. Helpful as this formulation is, it is a little unsatisfying. For example, it is not hard to see how the demagogic cultural politics of the Third Reich used culturalism, as Appadurai defines it, to perpetuate what he calls "culture." It would make more sense, it seems to me, for Appadurai to stress the relation between culturalism and culture instead of drawing such a rigid distinction between them and to acknowledge that culturalism can serve a retrograde, even violently discriminatory, cultural politics as well as a progressive and liberatory one.

4. For a discussion of diasporas and globalization, see Robin Cohen's *Global Diasporas,* especially chap. 7.

5. For a sustained argument about the homogenizing effects of globalization, see Bauman.

6. Appiah cites studies of the reception of U.S. television by the media scholar, Larry Strelitz, in making this argument (109–10).

7. For an extended analysis of this process, see George Lipsitz's *Dangerous Crossroads.*

8. See Stephen Frears's film, *Dirty Pretty Things* (2005) for a dramatic treatment of the place of the undocumented migrant worker in the economy of globalized metropolitan Western cities.

9. Globalization theory was until recently dominated by male academics who paid scant attention to gender and the role of women in globalization. All the founding figures—Wallerstein, King, Robertson, Featherstone, Hannerz, Giddens, Harvey, Appadurai—are men. All the principal critics whose work is collected in *Culture, Globalization, and the World-System* (King) are male, while women are relegated to the role of respondents (Abu-Lughod, Abou-El-Haj, Turim, and Wolff). As Wolff pointedly notes, there is an "indifference" to gender in these papers (169). This problem unfortunately persists in Miyoshi and Jameson's *The Cultures of Globalization,* where only three of the eighteen contributors are women and where gender and women's issues are not part of the discussion. This lack is beginning to be rectified in the work of feminist critics such as Kaplan, Friedman, Grewal, and Tiffin, many of whom intervene in globalization studies from the fields of literary and cultural studies.

10. Freeman goes on in her essay to analyze the female higgler (a kind of trader) in the region of the Caribbean, an analysis that "challenges any notion that global spaces are traversed by men and gendered masculine" (1012) while women's experience (and power) under globalization is simply relegated to the local.

Chapter 4. Border Studies

1. While the places and borders are not constructed, the *idea* of the nation and the various configurations of its identities are constructed by the scholars and critics who study them.

2. Although the field of border studies developed in the United States along the lines I am sketching out, it is important to recognize that the concept has spread to border regions in disparate parts of the globe. One example would be the field of partition studies, which focuses on the history and effects of partition in West Bengal. Another would be the Centre for Cross Border Studies, located in Armagh and Dublin, which, according to its website, "researches and develops cooperation across the Irish border (between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland) in education, training, health, planning, public administration, communications, agriculture and the economy, and acts as secretariat for a number of cross-border educational networks." See http://www.crossborder.ie/.

3. See P. Jay (1998) for an overview of rise of U.S. border studies theory and criticism in the late 1980s and 1990s.

4. Pratt borrows the term "contact" from linguistics. In linguistics, she explains, "the term contact language refers to improvised languages that develop among speakers of different native languages who need to communicate with each other" (6). She equates the Creole or pidgin languages resulting from this improvisational interaction with the Creole or hybrid *cultures* that also result from this kind of sustained contact.

5. The character of Pratt's contact zone fits nicely with Appiah's theory that culture is always already contaminated. Indeed, it provides an explanation before the fact of how this contamination takes place.

6. For a critical discussion of this problem, see Kaup (2001), Fox (1999), and Sadowski-Smith (2008). Sadowski-Smith warns that one of "the more troubling aspects of liberating the border from its spatial referent to denote Chicana/o concerns with homeland, migration, identity, and aesthetics is that the voices of other border communities become muted" (35).

7. See Hortense Spillers for an excellent discussion of Faulkner's *Absalom, Absalom* in the context of "the politics of the New World" (1–16). See also Zamora's discussion of Faulkner in *Writing the Apocalypse* (32–45).

8. Those concerns are linked to what Gregory Jay calls "problematics," distinguished from "themes" in that they indicate "an event in culture made up simultaneously of material conditions and conceptual norms that direct the possibilities of representation" (277). The "problematics" he lists include origins, power, civilization, tradition, assimilation, translation, bodies, literacy, and borders.