5. Obviously enough, I am here speaking of their truth *when applied to literature*; in their original fields (biology and economic history) the two theories are simply incomparable.

6. Stephen Jay Gould, *Full House: The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin* (New York: Harmony, 1996), 220–21.

7. George Basalla, *The Evolution of Technology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 137–38.

8. See *Graphs, Maps, Trees* (London, 2005).

9. Thomas Pavel, *La Pensée du roman* (Paris, 2003).

10. Antonio Candido, *O discurso e a cidade* (São Paulo, 1993).

11. It can hardly be a coincidence that the greatest problematizer of narrative voice in western European literature—Joseph Conrad—had himself worked in the colonies, and owed his formal breakthrough (Marlow's laborious, defensive irony) to his wish to represent the periphery to a metropolitan audience. In his case, of course, the ingredients of the amalgamation are reversed: a plot from the periphery—and a style from the core

12. Boris Tomashevsky, "Thematics" (1925), in Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis (eds), *Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays* (Nebraska University Press, 1965), 68.

13. Here, the analogy with biological mutation is arresting. 'In DNA and protein regions of vital importance for function, one finds perfect—or almost perfect—conservation,' write Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi, and Piazza in *The History and Geography of Human Genes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, 15): 'this indicates strong selective control against changes that would be deleterious; it also shows that evolutionary improvement in this region is rare or absent. However, variation is quite frequent in chromosome regions that are not of vital importance.' Within narrative structure, bound motifs are the equivalent of those 'protein regions of vital importance for function,' where one finds 'near perfect conservation,' whereas the 'chromosome regions that are not of vital importance,' and where variation is therefore quite frequent, have their parallel in the 'free motifs' of Tomashevsky's model, which 'may be omitted without destroying the coherence of the narrative,' and which are as a consequence quite variable ('each literary school has its characteristic stock [of free motifs]').

14. Speaking of 'local' cultures does not exclude the existence of large regional systems (Indo-European, East Asian, Mediterranean, Meso-American, Scandinavian . . .), which may even overlap with each other, like the eight thirteenth-century 'circuits' of Janet Abu-Lughod's *Before European Hegemony* (Oxford, 1989). But these geographical units are not yet stably subordinated to a single center like the one that emerged in eighteenth century France and Britain.

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A New Comparative Literature[1] (2006)

Emily Apter

Professor of French and Comparative Literature at New York University, Emily Apter was educated at Harvard and Princeton Universities. She works in literatures of France, North Africa, the Caribbean, Germany, Britain, and North America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Her recent essays have focused on paradigms of "oneworldedness" especially as conceived by Édouard Glissant, on literary world-systems, and on translation as a form of intellectual labor. Her books include *Feminizing the Fetish: Psychoanalysis and Narrative Obsession in Turn-of-the-Century France* (1991), and *Continental Drift* (1999), an important study of the interplay of writing in France and in France's former colonies.

In *The Translation Zone: A New Comparative Literature* (2006), Apter rethinks translation in light of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center in New York. In particular, she considers the expansion of the field of translation studies from its traditional concern with linguistic fidelity to original texts to include both real-world issues such as war and conceptual issues such as the use of creoles and pidgins in literature, and she discusses the place of language and literature in debates about canon formation. In the book's concluding essay, included here, Apter seeks to break the identification of language with nation. What she proposes is "a new Comparative Literature" based on translation, which she sees variously initiated in the work of Leo Spitzer, Jacques Derrida, Edward Said, and Gayatri Spivak.

In attempting to rethink critical paradigms in the humanities after 9/11, with special emphasis on language and war, the problem of creolization and the mapping of languages "in-translation," shifts in the world canon and literary markets, and the impact of enhanced technologies of information translation, I have tried to imagine a program for a new comparative literature using translation as a fulcrum. I began with an attempt to rethink the disciplinary "invention" of comparative literature in Istanbul in the 1930s, using the work of Leo Spitzer and Erich Auerbach as figures whose names became synonymous with defining early iterations of global humanism in exile. I end with some reflections on what happens to philology when it is used to forge a literary comparatism that has no national predicate, and that, in naming itself *translatio* names the action of linguistic self-cognizing, the attempt to bring-to-intelligibility that which lies beyond language ("God," Utopia, Nature, DNA, a Unified Field Theory of Expressionism).

In naming a translational process constitutive of its disciplinary nomination comparative literature breaks the isomorphic fit between the name of a nation and the name of a language. As Giorgio Agamben has observed (with reference to Alice Becker-Ho's determination that Gypsy *argot* failed to qualify as a language since Gypsies as a people were deemed to be without nation or fixed abode), "we do not have, in fact, the slightest idea of what either a people or a language is" (*Means without Ends*, 64).[2] The Gypsy case, for Agamben, reveals the shaky ground on which language nomination rests. In affirming that "Gypsies are to a people what *argot* is to language," Agamben unmasks standard language names as specious attempts to conceal the fact that "all peoples are gangs and *coquilles*, all languages are jargons and *argots*" (65, 66). For Agamben, languages that defy containment by structures of the state (as in Catalan, Basque, Gaelic), or the blood and soil mythologies of peoples, might conceivably prompt the ethical "experience of the pure existence of language" (68). "It is only by breaking at any point the nexus between the existence of language, grammar, people, and state that thought and praxis will be equal to the tasks at hand," Agamben concludes (69).

Samuel Weber performs a similar dissection of national/nominal language fallacies with more direct pertinence to translation, noting that,

> [T]he linguistic systems between which translations move are designated as "natural" or "national" languages. However, these terms are anything but precise or satisfactory. . . . The imprecision of these terms is in direct proportion to the linguistic diversity they seek to subsume. . . . The difficulty of finding a generic term that would accurately designate the class to which individual languages belong is indicative of the larger problem of determining the principles that give those languages their relative unity or coherence—assuming, that is, that such principles really exist.[3]

Comparative literature answers Weber's call for the generic term to which individual languages belong. As such, it functions as an abstract generality or universal sign on the order of Wittgenstein's *Urzeichen* [elemental sign], which sounds out the *forçage*[4] of nation-subject and language-subject in the process of nomination. We hear this *forçage* in an expression like *traduit de l'américain* ("translated from the American"), which captures a nonexistent language coming into being through the act of rendering it coincident with the name of a nation or people. There is, of course, no standard language with discrete grammatical rules and protocols called "American." "American" may be the name of a language referring (in nominalist terms) to a possible world of language, but it is neither a term used by North American speakers of English to refer to their idiolect, nor a legitimate nation-marker. (As Jean-Luc Godard said recently, "I would really like to find another word for 'American.' When someone says 'American' they mean someone who lives between New York and Los Angeles, and not someone who lives between Montevideo and Santiago.")[5] As the name of a language, "American" implicitly consigns Spanish to "foreign"-language status even though millions of hemispheric subjects of the Americas claim Spanish as their native tongue. A new comparative literature would acknowledge this jockeying for power and respect in the field of language. A new comparative literature seeks to be the name of language worlds characterized by linguistic multiplicity and phantom inter-nations.

In *Poétique de la relation* Edouard Glissant authorizes the move toward linguistic inter-nationalism when he subordinates instabilities of nomination to geopoetics, replacing the old center-periphery model with a world system comprised of multiple linguistic singularities or interlocking small worlds, each a locus of poetic opacity. Glissant's paradigm of the *tout-monde*, building on the nondialectical ontological immanence of Deleuze and Guattari, offers a model of aporetic community in which small worlds (modeled perhaps after a deterritorialized Caribbean) connect laterally through bonds of Creole and a politics of mutualism centered on resistance to debt. Looking ahead to a day when *toutmondisme* will surpass

tiermondisme, that is to say, when the nation form gives way to the immanent, planetary totality of Creole, Glissant imagines Creole "transfigured into word of the world."[6] Building on Glissant, the authors of *Éloge de la créolité* envision *créolité* as "*the world diffracted but recomposed*, a maelstrom of signifieds in a single signifier: a Totality . . . . *full knowledge of Creoleness*, they argue, *will be reserved for Art*, for art absolutely."[7] As Peter Hallward has remarked: "The nation's loss is . . . Creole's gain."[8]

Insofar as Creole heralds a condition of linguistic postnationalism and denaturalizes monolingualization (showing it to be an artificial arrest of language transit and exchange), it may be said to emblematize a new comparative literature based on translation. Though, as I have argued in this book, Creole has emerged as an omnibus rubric, loosely applied to hybridity, *métissage*, platforms of cross-cultural encounter, or to language as a critical category of literary history; it has also emerged as a synonym for traumatic lack. Marked by the Middle Passage, and the coarse commands of human traffickers and plantation owners, Creole carries a history of stigma comparable to that of pidgin translation in nineteenth-century Chinese. In Haun Saussy's estimation, Chinese pidgin translation was, for the grammarians, an exhibition of "incompleteness . . . an unequal relationship between normal speech in the target language and the halting, misarticulated, or excessive speech of the source language it represents." In Saussy's reading, Walter Benjamin's sacred, interlinear ideal of translation offers the possibility of revaluing pidgin because interlinear's word-for-word literalism authorizes a translation full of holes: "Pidgin stands for—it makes audible and visible—the incommensurability of languages. The discussion of Chinese, that 'grammarless' language, gives pidgin its greatest representational license."[9] Recuperated in the guise of sacred translation, Creole, like pidgin, may be cast as a language "blessed" with the fullness of aporia.

For Derrida, the aporia names the conceptual impasse of death lodged in the body of language. Beginning with a phrase "*Il y va d'un certain pas* [It involves a certain step/not; he goes along at a certain pace]," Derrida associates the *pas* with a "recumbant corpse" or limit-condition between language and that which is other to itself:[10]

> a Babel "*from* and *within* itself . . . the stranger at home, the invited or the one who is called. . . . This border of translation does not pass among various languages. It separates translation from itself, it separates translatability within one and the same language. A certain pragmatics thus inscribes this border *in the very inside of the so-called French language.*" (*Aporias*, 10)

Derrida's concept of aporia—heard in the "*no, not, nicht, kein*" of alterity—is linked to the politics of monolingualism in *Monolingualism of the Other: Or the Prosthesis of Origin* (1996).[11] The book's epigraphs from Glissant and Abdelkebir Khatibi attest to a rare engagement with *francophonie* as theoretical terrain. Derrida, with tongue in cheek, competes with Khatibi for title to the stateless status of the *Franco-Magrébin* subject. The hyphen signifies all the problems of national/linguistic unbelonging characteristic of post-Independence Algerians, including the way in which Jews, Arabs, and French were neighbored, yet separated, by the French language. "This language will never be mine," says Derrida of French, drawing from his own experience of national disenfranchisement the lesson that language is loaned to communities of speakers. "The untranslatable remains (as my law tells me) the poetic economy of the idiom" (56). Contrary to what one might expect, the prosthetic "other" in Derrida's title "monolingulism of the other," is not polyglottism, but an aporia within ipseity, an estrangement in language as such. For Derrida, untranslatability is the universal predicate of language names.

Derrida's aporia deconstructs the nationalist nominalism of language names by locating an always-prior other within monolingual diction. The aporia loosens the national anchor from the language name, wedging a politics of the subject between the name of a nation and the name of a language. Blocking the automatic association of specified language properties with the universal set of a given nation, Derrida's aporia approximates the logician's "X" in the modern nominalist formula "For any X, if X is a man, it is mortal," which disables the universal qualifier "all men are mortal" and relativizes the human status of the subject in question. X may or may not be a man in the same way that Francophone speaker X may or may not be French. The contingency of the subject suggests here that French speakers who are French nationals constitute one possible world of French speakers among many. Once the national predicate is dislodged, no speaker maintains exclusive ownership of language properties; the right to language is distributed more freely as language is classed as the property of X-many lease-holders.

Abolishing the divides of inside/outside, guest/host, owner/tenant, "the monolinguism of the other" names a comparatism that neighbors languages, nations, literatures, and communities of speakers. This idea of "neighboring" is borrowed from Kenneth Reinhard, specifically his Levinasian understanding of a "comparative literature otherwise than comparison . . . a mode of reading logically and ethically prior to similitude, a reading in which texts are not so much grouped into 'families' defined by similarity

and difference, as into 'neighborhoods' determined by accidental contiguity, genealogical isolation, and ethical encounter" ("Kant with Sade, Lacan with Levinas").[12] For Reinhard, treating texts as neighbors "entails creating anamorphic disturbances in the network of perspectival genealogies and intertextual relations. That is, before texts can be compared, one text must be articulated as the uncanny neighbor of the other; this is an assumption of critical obligation, indebtedness, secondariness that has nothing to do with influence, Zeitgeist, or cultural context" (Ibid., 796). Departing from philological tradition, which argues for textual relation based on shared etymology, tropes, aesthetic tastes, and historical trajectories, Reinhard proposes in their stead a theory of "traumatic proximity": "How [he asks] can we re-approach the traumatic proximity of a text, before or beyond comparison and contextualization? Asymmetrical substitution implies that there is no original common ground for textual comparison, but only the trauma of originary nonrelationship, of a gap between the theory and practice of reading that is only retroactively visible" (804). Reinhard's notion of "otherwise than comparison" shifts the problematic from language nomination to the ethics of traumatic proximity.

"Neighboring" describes the traumatic proximity of violence and love, manifest as exploded holes in language or translation gaps. Such spaces of nonrelation can be condemned as signs of profanation, but they are also susceptible to being venerated as signs of sacred incommensurability. These aporias are directly relevant to the problem of how a language names itself because they disrupt predication, the process by which verbal attributes coalesce in a proper name or noun.

The difficult process of depredication, otherwise known as secular criticism, is one of the premier tasks of philology, as conceived by Edward Said in his final writings. In a chapter of *Humanism and Democratic Criticism* devoted to "The Return of Philology," Said wrote:

> Philology is, literally, the love of words, but as a discipline it acquires a quasi-scientific intellectual and spiritual prestige at various periods in all of the major cultural traditions, including the Western and the Arabic-Islamic traditions that have framed my own development.
>
> Suffice it to recall briefly that in the Islamic tradition, knowledge is premised upon a philological attention to language beginning with the Koran, the uncreated word of God (and indeed the word "Koran" itself means reading), and continuing through the emergence of scientific grammar in Khalil ibn Ahmad and Sibawayh to the rise of jurisprudence *(fiqh)* and *ijtihad* and *ta'wil*, jurisprudential hermeneutics and interpretation, respectively.[13]

Said makes a sweeping pass through systems of humanistic education based on philology in Arab universities of southern Europe and North Africa in the twelfth century, Judaic tradition in Andalusia, North Africa, the Levant, and Mesopotamia, then on to Vico and Nietzsche. He extols a humanism of reading and interpretation "grounded in the shapes of words as bearers of reality, a reality hidden, misleading, resistant, and difficult. The science of reading, in other words, is paramount for humanistic knowledge" (58).

Just as *Humanism and Democratic Criticism* openly engages Leo Spitzer's philological legacy (Spitzer rather than Auerbach for once!), so too does the 2002 essay "Living in Arabic," which invites being read in tandem with Spitzer's "Learning Turkish." Spitzer with Said plays off the epistemological modalities of "living" and "learning" a language.[14] Where Spitzer fastened on the ontological implications of sequencing in Turkish, and emphasized how the consecutive unfolding ("one by one") of an action mimics the nature of experience, thereby enlivening narration in a uniquely "human and subjective way," Said gleaned significance from the relational gaps of word-by-word analysis. Spitzer was drawn to modes of expression that seemed wreathed in scare-quotes, that somehow marked "what is happening" as things happen. Interrogative enunciations in Turkish such as "He saw me, or did he not?" or "Did he or did he not open the door?" epitomized for Spitzer a habit of self-questioning that initiated an othering of self within subjectivity. The term *gibi* he suggested, whether attached to verb forms or just thrown out at random, indexed the speaker's loss of conviction in his own words. "Words no longer signify a definite event but carry the ambiguity of comparison within them." *Gibi*, then, was interpreted as a part of speech tailored for the philologist, for it called attention to how each word internalizes comparability. Similarly, in his conclusion to "The Return to Philology," Said fixed on the "space of words" as the aporia of comparison. Humanism, he maintained,

> is the means, perhaps the consciousness we have for providing that kind of finally antinomian or oppositional analysis between the space of words and their various origins and deployments in physical and social place, from text to actualized site of either appropriation or resistance, to transmission, to reading and interpretation, from private to public, from silence to explication and utterance, and back again, as we encounter our own silence and mortality—all

> of it occurring in the world, on the ground of daily life and history and hopes, and the search for knowledge and justice, and then perhaps also for liberation. (83)

As if anticipating Said's lifelong commitment to a lexicon of exile affording existential humanism, Spitzer delighted in the way in which the grammar of mitigation—the generous sprinkling of equivalent terms for "buts" and "howevers" through Turkish speech—afforded felicitous relief "to the thinking man from the pressures of this difficult life." "In this decreasing voice," Spitzer asserted, "I see our humility. For an instant, the human spirit descends to pessimism to rid itself of numbness, triumphing over difficulty through reason. Thus a small word like 'but,' or 'yet,' though a mere grammatical tool of negation, becomes an emotional manifestation loaded with the weight of life. In these small words, we see humanity deal with adversity." Spitzer traveled down to the micrological stratum of speech particles to observe "life" swimming against the current of "death." Grammatical markers of doubt or negation were cast as valves that released the pressure that builds up in the course of fighting to stay alive, rallying the subject's determination to go on. For Said, these particles comprise a syntax of traumatic incommensurability; they contour the aporias of militant love. Said and Spitzer seem to have entered into stichomythia in their common regard for word spacing as the "program" of life and death, the grammar of grounding and unhoming. Saidian-Spitzerian philology portends the advent of a translational humanism that assumes the disciplinary challenges posed by Turkish and Arabic in their respective circumstances of institutional exile. Turkish and Arabic name, for each of them, a crisis of theo-poetics in secular time.

In his considerations on the status of Arabic language, which one can only speculate might have been the subject of a book-in-the-making, Said experimented with using philology to re-articulate the sacred otherwise. It was as if he were aware of Kenneth Reinhard's conviction that the unconscious—like divine language—comes through in the desire to "respeak or repunctuate" a language that comes from the outside, bearing "the marks of its strange desires and cruel imperatives."[15] Rather than dodge the issue of how a secular language copes with the mandate of neighboring a sacred tongue, Said took up the problem of "living in Arabic," a task complicated in everyday life by the split between classical (*fus-ha*) and demotic (*'amiya*).[16] Though one of Said's clear intentions in the essay was to reform Arabic so that it could better deal with classical expression in quotidian speech, his greatest concern, it would seem, was to use philology to de-

translate the "fundamentalist" attribution of Arabic. To this end, he recalled the term *al-qua'ida* to its philological function (as the word for "grammar," or "base" of language), just as in *Humanism and Democratic Criticism*, he reclaimed *jihad* for secular usage, contextualizing it as commitment to "*isnad*" or hermeneutical community:[17]

> Since in Islam the Koran is the Word of God, it is therefore impossible ever fully to grasp, though it must repeatedly be read. But the fact that it is in language already makes it incumbent on readers first of all to try to understand its literal meaning, with a profound awareness that others before them have attempted the same daunting task. So the presence of others is given as a community of witnesses whose availability to the contemporary reader is retained in the form of a chain, each witness depending to some degree on an earlier one. This system of interdependent readings is called "*isnad*." The common goal is to try to approach the ground of the text, its principle or *usul*, although there must always be a component of personal commitment and extraordinary effort, called "*ijtihad*" in Arabic. (Without a knowledge of Arabic, it is difficult to know that "*ijtihad*" derives from the same root as the now notorious word *jihad*, which does not mainly mean holy war but rather a primarily spiritual exertion on behalf of the truth.) It is not surprising that since the fourteenth century there has been a robust struggle going on about whether *ijtihad* is permissible, to what degree, and within what limits. (68–69)

As this passage affirms, Said was committed to extracting the predicate "terror" from Arabic as the name of a language. But in seeking to secularize the sacred word, Said wandered into the nominalist quandary of how to name languages otherwise. The need to disrupt the deep structural laws by which languages are named after nations, peoples, and God-terms complemented Said's concern to posit a philological humanism no longer hobbled by neo-imperialist jingoism, no longer shy of facing off against the autocracy of theocratic speech-acts, and yet, also no longer able to deny the idea of "life" as an untranslatable singularity, a "cognition of paradise" that assumes tangible guise in Babel or the "afterlife" of translation.[18] Linguistic monotheism (inherent in Derrida's "monolingualism of the other"), Said's paradigm of "Living in Arabic" (the set that excludes itself, the logic of one sacred language constituted as two—*fus-ha* and *'amiya*), and Spitzer's paradigm of "Learning Turkish" (which activates standing reserves of nontranslation) together push the limits of how language thinks

itself, thereby regrounding the prospects for a new comparative literature in the problem of translation.

Notes

1. From *The Translation Zone: A New Comparative Literature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 243–51. Notes are the author's.

2. Giorgio Agamben, *Means without Ends: Notes on Politics*, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).

3. Samuel Weber, "A Touch of Translation: On Walter Benjamin's 'Task of the Translator,'" in *The Ethics of Translation*, eds. Sandra Bermann and Michael Wood (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 66.

4. "Forcing" in a horticultural sense, as when plants are made to bloom early.

5. Jean-Luc Godard in interview with Manohla Dargis, "Godard's Metaphysics of the Movies," *New York Times*, Nov. 21, 2004, Arts and Leisure, 22.

6. Edouard Glissant, *Poétique de la relation* (Paris: Gallimard, 1990), 88.

7. Jean Bernabé, Patrick Chamoiseau, Raphael Confiant, *Éloge de la créolité*. Edition bilingue français/anglais, trans. M. B. Teleb-Khyar (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), pp. 88–90. Emphasis in italics as appears in the original.

8. Peter Hallward, "Edouard Glissant between the Singular and the Specific," in *The Yale Journal of Criticism* 11:2 (1998), 455.

9. Haun Saussy, *The Great Wall of Discourse and Other Adventures in Cultural China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard East Asian Monographs/Harvard University Press, 2001), 78–79.

10. Jacques Derrida, *Aporias*, trans. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 6.

11. The word *négritude* offers a good example of a "prosthesis of origin" since it was coined by Aimé Césaire in Martinique, a place that had no single African language on which to ground it.

12. Kenneth Reinhard, "Kant with Sade, Lacan with Levinas," *Modern Language Notes* 110:4 (1995), 785.

13. Edward Said, *Humanism and Democratic Criticism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 58.

14. Leo Spitzer, "Learning Turkish," in *Varlik* [Being], Nos. 19, 35, and 37, 1934. Translation by Tülay Atak.

15. "The unconscious is like a text without punctuation written in familiar characters and a foreign language, a sacred or *revealed* text, moreover, in the sense that the discourse it speaks comes from the outside, from the Other, and bears the marks of its strange desires and cruel imperatives. The interpretive work of analysis is not to translate it so much as to *rearticulate* it, to respeak and repunctuate its components: here a stop or blockage separating two morphemes or phonemes is elided, there an associative connection is severed; or perhaps an isolated and intransigent signifier in the unconscious stream, the pole star of a discursive constellation or 'complex,' is put into significative motion, and another falls out of circulation, as a newly fixed and unspeakable center of gravitation." Kenneth Reinhard, "Lacan and Monotheism: Psychoanalysis and the Traversal of Cultural Fantasy," in *Jouvert* 3:12 (1999), 7. http://social.chass.ncsu.edu /jouvert/v3i12/reinha.htm.

16. On the issue of two Arabic languages in one, see Iman Humaydan Younes, "Thinking *Fussha*, Feeling *'Amiya*: Between Classical and Colloquial Arabic," *Bidoun: Arts and Culture from the Middle East*, 2:1 (2004): 66–67.

17. "In a few years I felt I had no alternative but to commit myself to a re-education in Arabic philology and grammar. (Incidentally, the word for grammar is the plural *qawa'id*, whose singular form is the by now familiar *al-qua'ida*, also the word for a military base, as well as a rule, in the grammatical sense.)" Edward Said, "Living in Arabic," *Raritan* 21:4 (2002), 229.

18. The phrase "cognition of Paradise," close to the concept of "imparadising" that I developed in my chapter on Saidian humanism, was used by Martin Vialon in an unpublished essay on the Arcadian paintings of Traugott Fuchs, another German émigré who made his career in Istanbul under the mentorship of Spitzer and Auerbach. See "The Scars of Exile: Paralipomena concerning the Relationship between History, Literature and Politics—Demonstrated in the Examples of Erich Auerbach, Traugott Fuchs and Their Circle in Istanbul." I am grateful to Martin Vialon for his rich, ongoing research on Auerbach's Istanbul exile, and for his willingness to share work in progress.